IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA


RICHARD JOSEPH HAMM, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 42188

FILED

FEB 12 2004

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE



This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying appellant's post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

In the petition, appellant presented claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court found that counsel was not ineffective. The district court's factual findings regarding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are entitled to deference when reviewed on appeal. Appellant has not demonstrated that the district court's findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence or are clearly wrong. Moreover, appellant has not demonstrated that the district court erred as a matter of law.

¹See Riley v. State, 110 Nev. 638, 647, 878 P.2d 272, 278 (1994).

Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the attached order of the district court, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Gibbons

Becker, J.

Agosti, J.

cc: Hon. Steven P. Elliott, District Judge
Karla K. Butko
Attorney General Brian Sandoval/Carson City
Washoe County District Attorney Richard A. Gammick

Washoe District Court Clerk

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advised of the premises, denies the relief requested.

RICHARD JOSEPH HAMM,

v.

and THE STATE OF NEVADA,

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23 On May 24, 2001, Hamm was arrested and charged with a large 24 number of theft related felonies.

2. Following Hamm's arrest, the Washoe County Public Defender's 26 Office was appointed. Hamm's case was assigned to John Malone.

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

Petitioner,

Case No. CR01P1622

Dept. No. 10 STEFANIE HUMPHREY, WARDEN, WARM SPRINGS CORRECTIONAL CENTER,

> FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT

Respondents.

This matter came before the court on Hamm's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). The court has conducted an evidentiary hearing. The court, now being fully

Owing to his training and experience, Malone was well qualified to represent Hamm.

- After a reasonably complete investigation, Malone advised Hamm to accept a plea bargain. The plea bargain provided that, in exchange for Hamm's plea to three counts of burglary (and a plea to misdemeanor DUI in another case), the State would dismiss or otherwise not pursue any other charges or enhancements. It was understood the State could comment upon dismissed charges and was otherwise "free to argue" for the appropriate sentence. Hamm accepted the plea bargain.
- 4. On August 9, 2001, Hamm pleaded guilty to the three burglary counts. The court accepted Hamm's pleas following a thorough canvass.
- 5. Hamm's case proceeded to sentencing on September 11, 2001.
- 6. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Malone conducted a reasonably complete investigation designed to uncover mitigating evidence that would offset or otherwise diminish the impact of the severity of Hamm's numerous crimes and his extensive and undistinguished criminal history.
 - a. Following the investigation, Malone concluded the best strategy would be to offer a favorable substance abuse evaluation submitted by a local concern known as Family Counseling Services. The evaluation was

¹To the extent that Hamm claimed that his present sentence is based on a material mistake about his criminal record, the court finds the claim to be unfounded, or otherwise supported by evidence unworthy of belief.

submitted by Malone at the sentencing hearing, and the court took the evaluation into consideration when fashioning sentence. In conjunction with the evaluation, Malone would stress Hamm's long term and heretofore untreated drug addiction and then argue for concurrent sentences. Malone's theory being that a concurrent sentence would spell an earlier release for Hamm and then a quicker placement into the appropriate drug treatment program. Hamm agreed with this strategy; Hamm's testimony to the contrary at the habeas proceeding is not credible. Moreover, Malone's approach was not unreasonable under prevailing professional norms.

- b. At sentencing, Malone did not argue for probation.
 - i. Malone's failure to argue for probation was not unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Further, the court finds that no reasonably competent attorney, given Hamm's extensive criminal history, a history which included failed probations, would have even mentioned probation.
 - ii. Had Malone argued for probation, there is no reasonable probability that probation would have been imposed.
- c. At the sentencing hearing, Malone did not present any testimony from Hamm's family members, specifically

he did not present the testimony of his mother, father, aunt or ex-wife.

- i. The court finds that, had these witnesses been called at Hamm's sentencing hearing, each would have testified as he or she did in the present habeas proceeding.
- ii. Even if Malone did not contact these individuals personally and interview them, his decision to omit the testimony of these witnesses was not unreasonable under prevailing professional norms.
- iii. Had Malone presented the testimony of these omitted character witnesses, the court finds that there is no reasonable probability that a more lenient sentence would have been imposed.²
- d. Malone did not offer a document titled "Request for Program" commissioned by Hamm himself and submitted by the Salvation Army.
 - i. Malone, while being aware of the
 Salvation Army document and its contents,

²It should be noted that, while the court ordered each of Hamm's 16-72 month prison terms to run consecutively, Hamm was not given the maximum sentence. In short, the court finds that, whether taken alone or in conjunction with other omitted mitigating evidence, there is no reasonable probability that a more lenient sentence would have been imposed than the sentence already imposed in this case.

declined to offer it or argue its contents during the sentencing hearing.

- ii. Malone's decision to omit the Salvation Army document was not unreasonable under prevailing professional norms.
- iii. Had Malone offered the Salvation Army document and argued its mitigating value, there is no reasonable probability that a more lenient sentence would have been imposed than the sentence already imposed.
- e. Whether taken alone or in conjunction with every other item of mitigating evidence Hamm claimed Malone failed to offer, there is no reasonable probability that a more lenient sentence would have been imposed in this case.
- 7. During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor referred to Hamm as a "habitual criminal," even though Hamm was not formally charged as such.
 - a. Malone did not object to the prosecutor's remark on any grounds, including that it may have been a breach of the plea bargain.
 - b. While the plea bargain stipulated the prosecutor was "free to argue," it also stipulated that he could mention or comment on all charges which were dismissed or otherwise not pursued.
 - c. Malone's failure to object to the prosecutor's

characterization of Hamm as a "habitual criminal" was not unreasonable under prevailing professional norms.

- d. Had Malone objected, on the theory that the prosecutor's remark breached the plea bargain, the court would have overruled the objection.
- 8. Following the imposition of sentence, no appeal was pursued.
 - a. Malone did not inform or otherwise advise Hamm of his right to appeal.
 - b. At no relevant time did Hamm express a desire to appeal, nor did Hamm inquire about an appeal.
 - c. No event or circumstance transpired at the sentencing hearing giving rise to a situation in which Hamm might benefit from receiving advice about an appeal, including, but not limited to, the existence of a claim that had a reasonable likelihood of success.
 - i. The appellate claim pressed in the present habeas proceeding is the claim that the prosecutor breached the plea bargain. For the reasons already mentioned, and the findings already entered, the court believes that no objectively reasonable counsel would have believed this claim enjoyed a reasonable likelihood of success on appeal.
 - ii. Had an appeal been taken from the judgment of conviction, claiming the prosecutor breached the plea bargain, the

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probability that the Nevada Supreme Court would have reversed on that ground. iii. It is not disputed that Hamm was "unhappy" with his sentence. Accordingly, to the extent that Hamm's mere unhappiness triggered an obligation in Malone to advise Hamm of his appellate rights, and assuming Hamm would have insisted on an appeal challenging the severity of his sentence, the court finds that Hamm presented no theory in the habeas proceeding, which, if presented to the Nevada Supreme Court, would create a reasonable probability of reversal. sentence was well within the statutory range, it was not based on suspect or impalpable evidence, it did not shock the conscience, nor is the statute under which the sentence was imposed unconstitutional.

court believes there is no reasonable

9. The court has had a full and fair opportunity to review each of Hamm's claims under both state and federal standards pleaded in the petition.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Hamm has not been denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel within the contemplation of <u>Strickland v.</u> Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) or any of its local progeny.

JUDGMENT

It is therefore the judgment and order of the court that Hamm's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) be, and hereby is, denied.

DATED this 10 day of September, 2003.