IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DONALD WESLEY JANUARY, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. No. 41641

FEB 2 5 2004

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from an order of the district court dismissing appellant's post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant was originally convicted, pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere, of one count of battery causing substantial bodily harm. The district court sentenced appellant to a prison term of 24 to 60 months.

In the petition, appellant presented claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and argued that his guilty plea was invalid. The district court found that appellant had failed to make specific factual allegations, and the district court therefore dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing.² Appellant has not demonstrated that the district court erred.

¹Appellant pleaded guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). Under Nevada law, "whenever a defendant maintains his or her innocence but pleads guilty pursuant to Alford, the plea constitutes one of nolo contendere." State v. Gomes, 112 Nev. 1473, 1479, 930 P.2d 701, 705 (1996).

²See Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 621, 28 P.3d 498, 507 (2001) (holding that post-conviction claims must be supported by specific factual allegations).

Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the attached order of the district court, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Shearing, C.J.

Rose, J.

Maupin ...

cc: Hon. Robert E. Estes, District Judge
Rick Lawton
Attorney General Brian Sandoval/Carson City
Lyon County District Attorney
Lyon County Clerk

2 03 JUN 13 AM 9: 29 Department No. III 3 NIKKI A. BRYAN LYON COUNTY CLERK 4 **EPUTY** 5 6 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 7 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LYON 8 9 DONALD WESLEY JANUARY, 10 Petitioner, 11 ORDER DISMISSING WRIT OF 12 vs. HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION) 13 WARDEN, NORTHERN NEVADA 14 CORRECTIONAL CENTER, DON HELLING, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Issue 18 Before the court is the Petitioner DONALD WESLEY 19 JANUARY's Application for Setting and Respondents DON HELLING, 20 Warden, Northern Nevada Correctional Center, et al., Request to 21 Submit Petition of Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) and 22 Answer for Decision. 23 The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the 24 Petitioner on February 27, 2003. The Petitioner claims he is 25 26 being unjustly held because of denial of effective assistance of 27 counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 28 U.S. Constitution, and because of a violation of due process

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guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution since his guilty plea was (a) not entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, (b) predicated on ineffective assistance of counsel, and (c) based on a plea canvass that was insufficient since the trial court did not canvass the Petitioner regarding the meaning of an Alford Plea. An Answer to the Petition was filed by the Respondent on May 1, 2003. Counsel for the Petitioner then filed a Notice of Intent Not to File Supplement to Writ and Application for Setting on May 12, 2003, which requests a hearing be set on the Writ. The Respondent then filed an Opposition to Application for Setting and a Request to Submit Petition and Answer for Decision.

The question before the court is whether or not the Writ should be granted and whether or not an evidentiary hearing is necessary under NRS 34.770.

Rule

NRS 34.770 governs the process of determining the need for an evidentiary hearing on a Writ of Habeas Corpus. The rule states as follows:

- 1. The judge or justice, upon review of the return, answer and all supporting documents which are filed, shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. A petitioner must not be discharged or committed to the custody of a person other than
- the respondent unless an evidentiary hearing is held.
- 2. If the judge or justice determines that the petitioner is not entitled to relief and an evidentiary hearing is not required, he shall dismiss the petition without a hearing.

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3. If the judge or justice determines that an evidentiary hearing is required, he shall grant the writ and shall set a date for the hearing.

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When seeking post-conviction relief, a petitioner "cannot rely on conclusory claims for relief but must support any claims with specific, factual allegations that if true would entitle him or her to relief." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. ____, (2001).

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed according to the "reasonably effective assistance" standard as set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 In order to meet this standard, a petitioner must show (1984).that (1) counsel's performance fell below and objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Since this conviction is the result of an Nev. 396, 403 (1999). guilty plea, the petitioner "must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988 (1996), emphasis added by Kirksey court. (Quoting <u>Hill v. Lockhart</u>, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). See also State v. Langarica, 107 Nev. 932, 933, (1991).

When challenging the validity of a guilty plea, the plea is viewed as presumptively valid with a burden on the defendant to demonstrate that the plea was not entered knowingly

and intelligently. Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272 (1986). See also State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097. A reviewing court "should review the entire record, and look to the totality of the facts and circumstances of a defendant's case, to determine whether a defendant entered his plea with an actual understanding of the nature of the charges against him." Bryant at 271 (citations omitted). The standard of review as to whether or not a trial court committed reversible error in accepting such a guilty plea is a "clear abuse of discretion" standard. Id. at 272.

Analysis

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Although the Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the Petitioner has failed to provide sufficient facts that would, if true, entitle him to relief under the "reasonably effective assistance" requirement set out in Strick-land.

He claims that counsel failed to interview witnesses, but does not explain who these witnesses were or what information they might have provided. Thus the court cannot conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for the alleged improper act.

The same problem exists in the Petitioner's claims that counsel failed to inform him that a witness had given two conflicting written statements, failed to explain the <u>Alford</u>

1 plea and did not present the court the mitigating circumstance of self-defense. It is not sufficient to simply make broad allegations concerning omissions on the part of counsel. example, the Petitioner is not entitled to have a Writ of Habeas Corpus granted based on a claim that his attorney did not inform him of two conflicting statements given by a witness; under Kirksey, the Petitioner must provide facts that would be enough to establish a reasonable probability that but for the lack of information concerning the two statements he would have insisted In this case the Petitioner has not even on going to trial. informed the court as to what the two conflicting statements were or who made them.

Under the two prongs of the Strickland test, the court must be provided information that would allow it to conclude that there is a reasonable probability that had counsel not committed a specific unprofessional error, the Petitioner would have insisted on going to trial. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988 (1996). The allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel made by the Petitioner are insufficient to allow the court to reach this conclusion. Even if the allegations made by the Petitioner are true, in and of themselves they do not entitle the Petitioner to relief. Therefore, under NRS 34.770(2), no evidentiary hearing based on ineffective assistance of counsel is warranted.

Due Process

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Likewise, the Petitioner has failed to allege

sufficient facts to entitle him to relief as a result of violation of due process of law.

The Petitioner's claim that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily is a conclusory statement and provides no specific factual allegation which would overcome the presumption of validity of the guilty plea and entitle him to relief.

The Petitioner also claims violation of due process based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel has already been discussed, but it should be noted that this claim of a violation of due process is also a conclusory statement and does not provide any facts regarding acts or omissions on which the Petitioner's claim is based.

Finally, Petitioner also alleges that the plea canvass was insufficient since the Petitioner was not "canvassed regarding the meaning of the <u>Alford Plea."</u> Although it is not entirely clear from the Petitioner's statement, the court can only assume one of two things; either the Petitioner claims that due process of law was not given him since the Petitioner was not canvassed as to what he meant to accomplish by entering the <u>Alford Plea</u>, or the Petitioner simply alleges that the canvassing was incomplete since it did not include a questions about his understanding of the term "<u>Alford Plea</u>." In either case, no facts are presented and no evidence exists in the record to support this allegation and thereby require an evidentiary

hearing.

A trial court's responsibilities in regard to accepting an Alford Plea are explained in Tiger v. State, 98

Nev. 555, 558 (1982). Tiger holds that an Alford Plea "is constitutionally sound if it is knowingly entered for a valid reason, for instance, to avoid the possibility of a harsher penalty. However, the district judge, in accepting the plea, must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea, and he must further inquire into and seek to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of innocence. Alford, supra, 400 U.S. at 38 n. 10." As noted above, when reviewing a guilty plea to determine whether a defendant entered it knowingly and intelligently, the totality of the circumstances are examined. Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 271 (1986).

In reviewing the record in this case, we find that the Petitioner plead guilty to the offense of Battery Causing Substantial Bodily Harm at arraignment on October 7, 2002.

Transcript of Proceedings - Arraignment ("AT"), p.5. When asked what the Petitioner did to cause this charge to be brought, the Petitioner's attorney spoke:

"MR. MILLS: Your Honor, we'd ask you to accept this plea in the form of an Alford v. North Carolina plea.

Mr. January is doing this to avoid or limit his criminal liability in this matter.

The State would have evidence in this matter that on the 31st day of August Mr. January did hit Mr. Feldman, causing him to lose sight in one eye. And that it was done under circumstances in which Mr. January would not have any self-defense to that

charge, Your Honor." <u>AT</u>, p.7-8.

The prosecutor then added:

". . . There were also more serious charges that Mr. January could have faced in this matter, if he had not agreed to this negotiation." AT, p.8.

The Court then addressed the Petitioner personally:

"THE COURT: All right. Mr. January, did you understand what was represented to this Court by your attorney and by the District Attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And you adopt those statements as your own?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir.

THE COURT: All right. The Court will accept the plea pursuant to Alford v. North Carolina." AT, p.8.

The defendant was never directly asked if he knew what the definition of an Alford plea was or how it functions, but the Supreme Court of Nevada "has never required the 'articulation of talismanic phrases' at plea hearings," Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 271 (1986). The record clearly indicates on its face that the defendant intended to plead guilty, and that he understood a valid reason for entering into an Alford plea, namely to minimize his criminal liability. The record supports the presumption that the guilty plea was entered knowingly and intelligently. The requirements of Tiger are met by these facts, and the Petitioner has presented no facts that would contradict them.

None of the Petitioner's contentions under the Due

Process section of his petition allege facts that would necessi-

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1	tate an evidentiary hearing under NRS 34.770.
2	<u>Conclusion</u>
3	Respondent's motion to dismiss the Petitioner's
4	request for Writ of Habeas Corpus without an evidentiary hearing
5	is GRANTED.
6	DATED: This 12 day of June, 2003.
7	(1) (16)
8	ROBERT E ESTES DISTRICT JODGE
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10	<u>Certificate of Mailing</u>
11	I hereby certify that I, Beatrice McMinn, am an employee
12	of the Honorable Archie E. Blake, District Judge, and that on this
13	date pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I deposited for mailing at Yerington,
14	Nevada, a true copy of the foregoing document addressed to:
15	Eileen Barnett Deputy District Attorney
16	31 South Main Street
17	Yerington, Nevada 89447
18	Rick Lawton Attorney At Law
19	P.O. Box 1740 Fallon, Nevada 89407
20	DATED: This American day of June, 2003.
21	DATED: THIS MAY DIVINE, 2003.
22	Beatrice McMinn
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