IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

MARC J. ANTON,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK, AND THE HONORABLE
GENE T. PORTER, DISTRICT JUDGE,
Respondents,
and
NGHI LAM,
Real Party in Interest.

No. 40069

E002 1 2 YAM

CLERK DE SUPREME COURT

BY

CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

This original petition for a writ of prohibition challenges the district court's order granting of the real party in interest's motion to admit an arbitration award pursuant to NRS 38.259, but contrary to Nevada Arbitration Rule 20.1 We have considered this petition and the answer provided by the real party in interest, and we are not satisfied that this court's intervention by way of extraordinary relief is warranted at this time.² Accordingly, we

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

03-08578

¹Cf. In the Matter of the Development of Alternatives to Traditional Litigation for Resolving Legal Disputes, ADKT 126 (Order Amending NAR 20, April 28, 2003).

²See NRAP 21(b); Smith v. District Court, 113 Nev. 1343, 950 P.2d 280 (1997).

ORDER the petition DENIED.

Agosti

Shearing

J.

Rose

Leavitt

J.

cc: Hon. Gene T. Porter, District Judge Beckley Singleton, Chtd./Las Vegas Connolly & Fujii Mainor Harris Bradley Drendel & Jeanney Clark County Clerk

Gibbons

BECKER, J., concurring:

In light of our recent decision to amend Nevada Arbitration Rule 20 to mirror the language of NRS 38.259, I concur with the denial of the petition. The conflict between former NAR 20 and NRS 38.259 was the only issue raised in the petition. No other challenges to NRS 38.259 were argued, therefore, the petition is most and should be denied.

Becker, J.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA MAUPIN, J., concurring:

I join in the comments made by Justice Becker in her concurrence to the order in this matter. While I have signed the separate order amending NAR 20, I wish to voice my concern that members of the state judiciary took it upon themselves to lobby for the enactment of NRS 38.259. From my review of the legislative history of the statute, it appears that the sole reason the judiciary supported this measure stems from perceived problems of calendar congestion in the larger judicial districts. To me, calendar congestion is not a proper justification to change or create a substantive rule of evidence.

Maupin J.