## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DENNIS MEADOWS,
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

No. 39823

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## ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE



This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of burglary. The district court adjudicated appellant Dennis Meadows as an habitual offender according to NRS 207.010(1)(a). Meadows was sentenced to serve a term of eight to twenty years in the Nevada State Prison. This appeal followed.

Meadows contends that the district court failed to exercise its discretion at sentencing in regard to his habitual offender adjudication. Specifically, Meadows claims that the district court abdicated its authority by imposing the sentence the State requested. He also contends that he entered into an improper stipulation in his guilty plea because, according to this court's holding in <u>Staley v. State</u> case, a defendant cannot simply stipulate to habitual criminal status.<sup>1</sup>

We conclude that no error occurred in this regard. The record reveals that the district court was well aware it need not follow the State's recommended sentence, and the court commented to that effect at Meadows's arraignment. Further, we conclude that the guilty plea agreement in this case did not run afoul of <u>Staley</u>. The holding in <u>Staley</u>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Staley v. State, 106 Nev. 75, 787 P.2d 396 (1990); see also Clark v. State, 109 Nev. 426, 428-29, 851 P.2d 426, 427-28 (1993) (decision to adjudicate defendant as habitual offender is not an automatic one).

protects defendants against the danger of insufficient proof of the prior convictions required for habitual criminal status. Because the district court conducted an independent review at sentencing of the proof of Meadows's prior convictions, we conclude that the habitual criminal adjudication was not automatic and that the district court properly exercised its discretion.<sup>2</sup> Thus, we conclude that Meadows's contention lacks merit.

Meadows also contends that the sentence he received as an habitual offender is so disproportionately harsh compared to the crime of burglary as to shock the conscience.<sup>3</sup> We disagree.

This court has consistently afforded the district court wide discretion in its sentencing decision.<sup>4</sup> This court will refrain from interfering with the sentence imposed "[s]o long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See <u>Hughes v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 327, 332-33, 996 P.2d 890, 893-94 (2000) (district court exercised sufficient discretion in habitual criminal determination based on the record as a whole); <u>see also Clark</u>, 109 Nev. at 428-29, 851 P.2d at 427-28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Meadows relies primarily on <u>Solem v. Helm</u>, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) and <u>Schmidt v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 665, 584 P.2d 695 (1978). Meadows also invites this court to review his sentence as discussed in <u>Tanksley v. State</u>, 113 Nev. 844, 850, 944 P.2d 240, 244 (1997) (Rose, J., dissenting). We decline to do so.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>See Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 747 P.2d 1376 (1987).

suspect evidence."<sup>5</sup> Moreover, a sentence within the statutory limits is not cruel and unusual punishment where the statute itself is constitutional.<sup>6</sup>

In this case, Meadows does not allege that the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence or that the relevant statute is unconstitutional. Further, we note that the sentence imposed was within the parameters provided by the relevant statutes. We also note that the habitual criminal enhancement is deliberately punitive, intended to discourage criminals who habitually offend society's laws. Therefore, we conclude that Meadows's sentence does not shock the conscience.

Having considered Meadows's claims and concluded that they lack merit, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Shearing J.

Becker, J.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup><u>Blume v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (quoting <u>Culverson v. State</u>, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d 220, 221-22 (1979)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>See NRS 205.060(1), NRS 207.010(1)(a).

<sup>8</sup>See Sims v. State, 107 Nev. 438, 440, 814 P.2d 63, 64 (1991).

Hon. Steven R. Kosach, District Judge cc: Washoe County Public Defender Attorney General/Carson City Washoe County District Attorney Washoe District Court Clerk

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