## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ANTONIO SANCHEZ-FRANCO, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. No. 39341

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## ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying appellant Antonio Sanchez-Franco's post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

In his petition and again on appeal, Sanchez-Franco presented claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court found that counsel was not ineffective. The district court's factual findings regarding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are entitled to deference when reviewed on appeal.<sup>1</sup> Sanchez-Franco has not demonstrated that the district court's findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence or are clearly wrong.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, Sanchez-Franco has not demonstrated that the district court erred as a matter of law.

<sup>1</sup><u>See Riley v. State</u>, 110 Nev. 638, 647, 878 P.2d 272, 278 (1994). <sup>2</sup><u>Id.</u>

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the attached order of the district court, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

J. Shearing J.

Leavitt

er Bed J.

Becker

cc: Hon. Peter I. Breen, District Judge Scott W. Edwards Attorney General/Carson City Washoe County District Attorney Washoe District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

## ORIGINAL

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1	RONALD ALCOSTIN, JR.
2	BY
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6	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
8	* * *
9	ANTONIO SANCHEZ-FRANCO,
10	Petitioner,
11	v. Case No. CR95P3046
12	E.K. McDANIEL, WARDEN, Dept. No. 7
13	Respondent.
14	/
15	FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT
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17	This cause came before the court upon a petition for
18	writ of habeas corpus (post-conviction). Petitioner Sanchez-
19	Franco was represented by John Arrascada when he was convicted by
20	a jury verdict of second-degree murder. The case involved a
21	shooting outside the Planet Hollywood in downtown Reno nearly
22	seven years ago.
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23	Sanchez-Franco defended on a theory of mistaken
24	Sanchez-Franco defended on a theory of mistaken identity and supported that with aggressive cross-examination of
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1 found him guilty of second-degree murder. Sanchez-Franco appealed but the judgment was affirmed. He then filed a petition 2 3 for writ of habeas corpus asserting generally that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. 4 The court 5 appointed attorney Mary Lou Wilson who filed a supplemental petition and corrections to the supplement. Subsequently, Ms. 6 7 Wilson was disgualified as it appeared that she was a potential 8 witness in the action. The court then appointed Scott Edwards to 9 represent petitioner. Mr. Edwards elected not to raise any 10 additional claims.

11 The cause was set for a hearing on February 15, 2002. 12 At the outset Petitioner abandoned most of his claims and 13 announced that he would be going forward only on the claim that 14 counsel was ineffective in failing to present certain alibi 15 witnesses at the trial.

The court heard testimony from trial counsel, from Petitioner, and from two proposed alibi witnesses. Upon consideration of the relative credibility of the witnesses, the court finds as follows.

Trial counsel testified credibly that he had thoroughly investigated the proposed alibi and was prepared to present that testimony if necessary. However, he felt that the alibi witnesses were weak due to inconsistent statements and vagueness about the time frames at issue. He and Petitioner discussed the strategy at length and jointly decided not to weaken the case by adding the testimony of his friends. Even Sanchez-Franco

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conceded that the decision not to present any alibi witnesses was
a tactical decision with which he concurred.

One would assert a claim of ineffective assistance of 3 counsel bears the burden of demonstrating by strong and 4 convincing evidence that the conduct of his attorney fell below 5 6 an objective standard of reasonableness and that but for the 7 failings of counsel, the result would likely have been different. 8 Reviewing courts must give great deference to the decisions of 9 counsel and the decisions must not be viewed with the benefit of 10 hindsight. Strategic and tactical decisions especially are 11 virtually unassailable absent extraordinary circumstances. See 12 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 13 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

This Court finds that trial counsel was not 14 15 unreasonable. The decision to focus the attention of the jury on 16 the flaws in the government's case and not to distract from that 17 with weak alibi witnesses was reasonable. Presenting the weak 18 alibi would lead to the risk that if the jury believed the alibi 19 witnesses were lying, they would pay no heed to the problems with 20 the identification testimony. Furthermore, the court finds that 21 Sanchez-Franco was a full participant in the decision making 22 process and agreed to forego the additional witnesses and agreed 23 to decline to testify himself. Accordingly, the court finds that 24 Sanchez-Franco has failed to prove that his counsel acted 25 unreasonably.

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The court also finds no prejudice stemming from the

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1 lack of the additional witnesses.

One proposed witness was the vice principal of a high school. While Sanchez-Franco testified that he was at a dance at the school but left sometime before the killing in downtown Reno, the witness could not even confirm that there was a dance that evening let alone that Sanchez-Franco was there.

7 The other witness, Rodrigo Flores, was noticeably hostile and combative. His intent to help his friend by means 8 9 fair or foul was apparent to this Court as the observer of his 10 demeanor. He was not a credible witness and the court has no 11 reason to believe that any juror would find otherwise. The court 12 also notes that he was a dangerous witness. In his effort to 13 help his friend, he managed to place Petitioner in the vicinity 14 of the killing very near to the time of the killing. Reasonable 15 counsel would not lightly present that sort of testimony to a 16 jury.

Of course Sanchez-Franco could have testified at trial that he was elsewhere at the time of the killing, but the court finds that he voluntarily decided not to subject himself to cross-examination at trial.

The court finds that counsel did not act unreasonably in failing to present at trial the testimony that was ultimately adduced at the habeas corpus hearing. The court also finds that the new testimony would not have affected the outcome of the ///

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trial. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus (post-conviction) is denied. DATED this <u>.21</u> day of February, 2002.