



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ROYAL UNION TRUST, A NEVADA
TRUST; ROYAL ESSEX, LLC, A
NEVADA DOMESTIC LIMITED-
LIABILITY COMPANY; MARLON
STEELE, JR., AS TRUSTEE OF THE
ROYAL UNION TRUST; VINCENT
HESSER, AN INDIVIDUAL; DAVID
WEEKS, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND
ROYAL UNION PROPERTIES, LLC,
Appellants,

vs.

MARTHA JANE HOLMAN,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER
CAPACITY AS THE TRUSTEE OF THE
GFH IRREVOCABLE TRUST; AND
GEORGE F. HOLMAN, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
THE TRUSTEE OF THE MJH
IRREVOCABLE TRUST,
Respondents.

No. 90695

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court post-judgment order granting a motion for attorney fees and costs. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Mark R. Denton, Judge.

The district court granted summary judgment for respondents (Holman) and against appellants (Royal Union), which we recently affirmed. *See Royal Union Tr. v. Holman*, No. 90095, 2026 WL 1362425 (Nev. May 14, 2026) (Order of Affirmance). After granting summary judgment, the district court awarded Holman roughly \$27,000 in attorney fees based on a prevailing-party provision in the parties' contract. In doing so, the district court declined to consider Holman's alternative argument

that fees were warranted under NRS 18.010(2)(b). On appeal, Royal Union contends that Holman was not entitled to the entire fee award because some of counsel's time was devoted to seeking fees under NRS 18.010. According to Royal Union, because the district court declined to award fees under NRS 18.010, Holman "lost" on that issue and should not be awarded fees for any time Holman's attorneys devoted to the NRS 18.010 issue.

We are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion. *Cf. Bobby Berosini, Ltd. v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals*, 114 Nev. 1348, 1353-54, 971 P.2d 383, 386 (1998) ("The decision to award attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court."). At its core, Royal Union's problem is with Exhibit 6 to Holman's motion for attorney fees, which lists counsel's billing entries from the time when Royal Union filed the underlying complaint to the time when counsel attended the summary judgment hearing. Exhibit 6 explained counsel's time spent on the case with descriptions like this for a 3-hour billing entry: "Finish researching for and drafting motion to dismiss and request for NRS 18.010 sanctions in the 2024 Royal v. Holman case." According to Royal Union, such an entry needed to specify what portion of billed time was spent on the NRS 18.010 issue because Holman "lost" on that issue, such that Holman should not be permitted to recover fees for that time.

As the district court implicitly found, Holman's billing entries and their explanations are typical and adequate. We have never held that an attorney's billing statement must delineate the amount of time dedicated to an individual issue or argument, as Royal Union demands here. Although Royal Union relies on *University of Nevada v. Tarkanian*, 110 Nev. 581, 879 P.2d 1180 (1994), that case does not support Royal Union's position. In *Tarkanian*, we upheld the reduction of an attorney-fee award

when the prevailing party lost on certain claims. *Id.* at 596, 879 P.2d at 1189. It is unreasonable to extend that logic to exclude time spent on an issue that the district court did not even resolve. Namely, doing so would require an attorney's billing statement to specify the particular issue or argument that was running through their mind at any given moment. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Exhibit 6 adequately described counsel's work on the underlying matter.

Alternatively, Royal Union contends that the \$27,000 in fees was unreasonable in light of the factors set forth in *Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank*, 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969). But Royal Union did not raise any *Brunzell* arguments in either its opposition to Holman's motion for attorney fees or at the February 13, 2025, hearing. Accordingly, we decline to consider Royal Union's *Brunzell* arguments on appeal. *See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown*, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the trial court . . . is deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal."). Consistent with the foregoing, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.



Bell, J.



Stiglich, J.



Cadish, J.

cc: Hon. Mark R. Denton, District Judge
Law Offices of Byron Thomas
Greenberg Traurig, LLP/Las Vegas
Eighth District Court Clerk