



IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

CARL DEAN EDWARDS,
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA AND NDOC,
Respondents.

No. 91502-COA

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Carl Dean Edwards appeals from a district court order denying a “Rule Civ. P. 60(a) motion to correct record; on independent action for mistake” filed on April 1, 2025. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Monica Trujillo, Judge.

In his motion, Edwards claimed the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) had incorrectly calculated his aggregate sentence and he was entitled to good time credits. The district court construed Edwards’ motion as a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the computation of time served and denied the claims on the merits.

We conclude that the district court properly construed Edwards’ motion as a postconviction habeas petition challenging the computation of time served, *see* NRS 34.724(2)(c) (stating a postconviction habeas petition “[i]s the only remedy available to an incarcerated person to challenge the computation

of time that the person has served pursuant to a judgment of conviction”),¹ but that it erred in reaching the merits of the motion without first determining whether Edwards had exhausted his administrative remedies, *see Hall v. Oliver*, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 70, 584 P.3d 161, 164 (Ct. App. 2025) (holding “that the exhaustion of all available administrative remedies is a procedural bar to such a petition being considered on the merits” and that “a court must determine whether a petitioner has exhausted all available administrative remedies before considering the merits of any claim”); NRS 34.724(1), (2)(c). Nonetheless, we further conclude the district court properly denied the requested relief because Edwards did not allege that he had exhausted his administrative remedies in his motion. *See Hall*, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 70, 584 P.3d at 165 (stating a petitioner must make specific factual allegations regarding exhaustion on the face of the petition); *see also Wyatt v. State*, 86

¹To the extent Edwards claimed that NDOC did not release him when ordered to do so by the Parole Board, such a claim is not properly raised in a postconviction habeas petition filed pursuant to NRS 34.724. *See* NRS 34.724(1); *see also* NRS 34.360 (stating a person may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of their imprisonment or restraint). To the extent Edwards also claimed that NDOC violated the Americans with Disabilities Act or that his booking number was changed, these claims fell outside the scope of claims permissible in a habeas petition. *See* NRS 34.724(1); *see also Bowen v. Warden*, 100 Nev. 489, 490, 686 P.2d 250, 250 (1984) (holding “a petition for writ of habeas corpus may challenge the validity of current confinement, but not the conditions thereof”).

Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) (holding a correct result will not be reversed simply because it is based on the wrong reason). Accordingly,² we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.



Bulla, C.J.



Gibbons, J.



Westbrook, J.

cc: Hon. Monica Trujillo, District Judge
Attorney General/Carson City
Attorney General/Las Vegas
Clark County District Attorney
Carl Dean Edwards
Eighth District Court Clerk

²Because Edwards' motion should have been dismissed without prejudice, see NRS 34.810(2), nothing in this order should be construed as precluding Edwards from filing a postconviction habeas petition challenging the computation of time served after the exhaustion of all available administrative remedies. We note that such a petition must substantially comply with the statutory form provided for in NRS 34.733.