

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

PHILIPPE ROUAS,  
Appellant,  
vs.  
BEAU MCCOY, AN INDIVIDUAL, AND  
SOLCADEMY LLC, A NEVADA  
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,  
Respondents.

No. 91728

**FILED**

FEB 20 2026

ELIZABETH A. BROWN  
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT  
BY   
DEPUTY CLERK

*ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL*

This is a pro se appeal from a November 26, 2025, district court order denying a motion for reconsideration, request for hearing, and motion to stay enforcement, and from an October 30, 2025, district court order granting a motion to enforce a settlement agreement and denying a motion to vacate execution of a confession of judgment. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Bitu Yeager, Judge.

Review of the notices of appeal and documents before this court reveals jurisdictional defects. This court “may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule.” *Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC*, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013). It does not appear that any statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from the challenged orders.

The November 26, 2025, district court order denies a motion for reconsideration, pursuant to NRCP 59(e) and NRCP 60(b), of a May 28, 2025, order granting respondents’ motion to enforce a settlement agreement. The order also denies requests for a hearing on the motion for reconsideration and a stay of enforcement of a confession of judgment pending the hearing. An order denying a motion for reconsideration can be appealable, if it is a post-judgment order. NRAP 3A(b)(2). Similarly, an order denying a motion for relief under NRCP 60(b) can be appealable if it

qualifies as a special order after final judgment. NRAP 3A(b)(8); see *Gumm v. Mainor*, 118 Nev. 912, 920, 59 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2002) (defining a special order after final judgment). However, it does not appear that a final judgment has been entered in this matter such that the November 26 order constitutes a post-judgment order or a special order after final judgment.

“[A] final judgment is one that disposes of all the issues presented in the case, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues such as attorney’s fees and costs.” *Lee v. GNLV Corp.*, 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000). Here, there does not appear to be any district court order finally resolving the claims asserted in the complaint and second amended counterclaim.

The May 28, 2025, order granting a motion to enforce a settlement agreement does not resolve any claims and is not a final judgment. See *Brown v. MHC Stagecoach*, 129 Nev. 343, 346, 301 P.3d 850, 852 (2013) (explaining that an order granting a motion to enforce a disputed settlement agreement is not a final appealable judgment where it does not enter judgment in favor of any party or otherwise resolve the pending claims); *Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg*, 110 Nev. 440, 446, 874 P.2d 729, 733-34 (1994) (concluding that a district court order approving a settlement agreement was not final and appealable where the order did not dismiss or otherwise resolve the parties’ claims).

While a confession of judgment was filed on July 11, 2025, that document is not signed by the district court or the court clerk, and is thus not effective as a judgment. See NRCP 58(c) (providing that a judgment is entered when it is signed by the court, or clerk when authorized, and that no judgment is effective until it is entered). Moreover, the confession of judgment does not purport to resolve any claims and thus does not dispose

of the issues presented in the case. *See Valley Bank*, 110 Nev. at 445, 874 P.2d at 733 (“This court determines the finality of an order or judgment by looking to what the order or judgment actually *does*, not what it is called.”); *GR Rehab Ctr., Inc. v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co.*, 331 So. 3d 270, 270-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021) (implicitly concluding that a payment constituting the functional equivalent of a confession of judgment was not a final appealable order where the litigation was not dismissed or resolved with finality and the lawsuit remained pending); *Martinez v. Robledo*, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 921, 923 n.2 (Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that a “judgment entered pursuant to a stipulation is ordinarily not appealable, but an exception exists where consent was given merely to facilitate an appeal and the judgment constitutes a final disposition of all claims”). *But see Coast to Coast Demolition & Crushing, Inc. v. Real Equity Pursuit, LLC*, 126 Nev. 97, 226 P.3d 605 (2010) (resolving an appeal from a confession of judgment without a discussion of substantive appealability).

In the absence of a final judgment there can be no post-judgment order or special order after final judgment. Therefore, the portion of the November 26, 2025, order denying reconsideration is not appealable pursuant to NRAP 3A(b)(2) or (b)(8). No other statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from that portion of the order or from the portions denying the requests for a hearing on the motion for reconsideration and a stay of enforcement of the confession of judgment pending the hearing.

For similar reasons, the district court’s October 30, 2025, order is also substantively unappealable. The October 30 order grants a motion to enforce the settlement agreement for a second time and denies a motion to vacate execution of the confession of judgment. As discussed above, an order granting a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is not appealable

