


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RONALD C. WILLIAMS,
Appellant,
vs.
WARDEN TIMOTHY FILSON;
OFFENDER MANAGEMENT
DIVISION; AND THE STATE OF
NEVADA,
Respondents.

No. 90139-COA

FILED

JAN 14 2026

ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY: 
DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Ronald C. Williams appeals from a district court order dismissing a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the computation of time served filed on July 25, 2024, and granting a “motion to refer petitioner for disciplinary proceedings for MJ 48 violation” filed on August 27, 2024. Seventh Judicial District Court, White Pine County; Gary Fairman, Judge.


In his petition, Williams claimed the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) had failed to award him COVID-19 credits and apply good time credits toward the minimum term of his aggregate sentence. He also appeared to claim the NDOC had precluded him from earning credits by failing to offer job or programming opportunities. Williams neither alleged nor demonstrated that he had exhausted his administrative remedies before filing the petition.¹ See NRS 34.724(1) (“Any person . . . who, after exhausting all available administrative remedies,

¹We note that Williams’ petition did not substantially comply with the statutory form for a time-computation petition, which includes questions related to the grievance of claims. See NRS 34.733.

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claims that the time the person has served pursuant to the judgment of conviction has been improperly computed may file a petition . . . to challenge the computation of time that the person has served.”); *see also* NRS 34.724(2)(c). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by dismissing Williams’ petition.² *See* NRS 34.810(2) (providing “[t]he court shall dismiss a petition that challenges the computation of time served . . . without prejudice if the court determines that the petitioner did not exhaust all available administrative remedies to resolve such a challenge as required by NRS 34.724”); *see also Hall v. Oliver*, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 70, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (Ct. App. 2025) (holding the exhaustion requirement “act[s] as a procedural bar to a postconviction habeas petition challenging the computation of time served”). Accordingly,³ we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.


_____, C.J.
Bulla


_____, J.
Gibbons


_____, J.
Westbrook

²The district court implicitly concluded that Williams had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when it cited NRS 34.724 and stated that, “[h]ad [Williams] followed the law, including the requirement regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies, [he] would have learned that his claims are frivolous.”

³Williams does not argue that the district court erred in granting the State’s motion to refer him for disciplinary proceedings. Thus, we conclude Williams fails to demonstrate any error with respect to said motion.

cc: Hon. Steven Dobrescu, Chief Judge
Seventh Judicial District Court, Department Two
Ronald Curtis Williams
Attorney General/Carson City
Attorney General/Ely
White Pine County Clerk