

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

GONZALO RAMOS,
Appellant,
vs.
MARIA LUISA SANCHEZ-PLATA,
Respondent.

No. 90886

FILED

JAN 12 2026

ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY 
DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal from a June 25, 2025, district court order in a divorce action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County; Stacy Michelle Rocheleau, Judge.

When this court's preliminary review of the documents before it revealed a potential jurisdictional defect in that the June 25 order might not be substantively appealable, appellant was ordered to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In particular, it appeared that the June 25 order merely enforces a prior order that awarded respondent a specific interest in the parties' community property and a later, September 23, 2024, order that enforced that interest by directing a sale of real property, such that it does not affect the rights growing out of the final judgment and is not appealable as a special order after final judgment. Further, to the extent the order denied appellant's countermotion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under NRCP 12 or to hold the proceedings in abeyance, we noted that no authority allowed for an appeal from such. Both parties timely filed responses. Appellant argues that the June 25 order is a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1) because it reduces the specific interest to judgment, and that it is a special order after

final judgment because it affects his right to possess the real property. Respondent disagrees.

This court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal only when the appeal is authorized by statute or court rule. *Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels*, 100 Nev. 207, 678 P.2d 1152 (1984). Although NRAP 3A(b)(1) authorizes an appeal from a final judgment, the June 25 order does not qualify as a final judgment because it did not resolve the claims and issues between the parties, as raised in the complaint for divorce and affecting the marriage's dissolution. Those claims and issues were initially resolved by the parties' 2023 stipulated divorce decree, which granted the subject real property to appellant as his sole and separate property and awarded a \$41,000 equalization payment to respondent, to be paid from the sale of the property. After that decree was later set aside and the marriage was declared void under NRS 125.290, the claims and issues were finally resolved on April 5, 2024, when the district court maintained the parties' previously stipulated community property division under the putative spouse doctrine, including the \$41,000 equalization payment to respondent. Reducing that award to judgment in the June 25 order for further enforcement purposes does not give rise to a new final judgment and a new right to appeal. Nor does it affect the rights of a party growing out of the April 5 order finally resolving the community property issues; therefore, it is not appealable as a special order after final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(8) on the basis that it reduces the equalization payment to judgment. *See Gumm v. Mainor*, 118 Nev. 912, 920, 59 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2002).

Moreover, as to the argument that the June 25 order is appealable as a special order after final judgment because it impacts appellant's right to possess the real property, we disagree. The 2023 decree

awarded the subject property to appellant as his sole and separate property but also indicated that he would pay the equalization payment from the sale of the property. The April 5 order maintained that stipulated division of community property and directed appellant to inform respondent by the end of the week whether he intended to refinance the mortgage or sell the home to provide the equalization payment. The district court's September 23, 2024, order indicates that appellant stated that he was unable to refinance or otherwise pay respondent the amount due and thus orders the property sold, as anticipated by the terms of the parties' division of community property and the April 5 order. The June 25 order then concludes that appellant, who was residing in the property, was impeding the sales process by refusing to cooperate with the listing agent and to show the property, and the court thus required him to vacate and granted respondent exclusive possession of the property. Because appellant did not have an absolute right to possess the property under the property division terms and the April 5 order, the vacatur and exclusive possession portions of the June 25 order, designed to enforce the September 23 order's directive to sell the property, do not affect his property rights growing out of the dissolution. Accordingly, the June 25 order is not a special order after final judgment on the basis that it directs appellant to vacate the property and gives exclusive possession to respondent. As we lack jurisdiction, we

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.

Stiglich, J.
Stiglich

Cadish, J.
Cadish

Lee, J.
Lee

cc: Hon. Stacy Michelle Rocheleau, District Judge, Family Division
David Bryce Finley
The Ramos Law Firm
Eighth District Court Clerk