

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

GERGIS R. GHOBRIAL, M.D.,
Appellant,
vs.
ADRIAN ERIC RAMOS, M.D.,
Respondent.

No. 91319

FILED

NOV 10 2025

ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY 
DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is a pro se appeal from an October 24, 2025, district court order denying a motion for relief pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(3).¹ Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Tina Talim, Judge. Review of the documents before this court reveals a jurisdictional defect. It does not appear the challenged order is substantively appealable.


Appellant asserts in the docketing statement that the order is appealable as a special order after final judgment. An order denying a motion for relief under NRCP 60(b) is generally appealable as a special order after final judgment. NRAP 3A(b)(8). But to qualify as a special order after final judgment, a post-judgment order must affect the rights of a party arising from the final judgment. *Winston Prods. Co. v. DeBoer*, 122 Nev. 517, 525, 134 P.3d 726, 731 (2006). Appellant's motion sought relief

¹Because the district court docket and minute entries indicated that appellant's motion was orally denied on September 5, but that no written order had been entered, this court ordered the district court to enter a written order resolving the motion. The district court complied by entering an order denying the motion on October 24, 2025. Accordingly, this appeal is construed as an appeal from the October 24 order. See NRAP 4(a)(2).

from the district court's March 11, 2025, order denying his motion to compel deposition testimony and for monetary sanctions. This court previously concluded that the March 11 order is not a final judgment and not otherwise appealable. *Ghobrial, M.D., v. Ramos*, No. 90387, 2025 WL 1232881 (Nev. April 25, 2025) (Order Dismissing Appeal). That determination is now the law of this case. See *Hsu v. Cnty. of Clark*, 123 Nev. 625, 629–30, 173 P.3d 724, 728 (2007). The order denying NRCP 60(b) relief from an unappealable order is not appealable as a special order after final judgment.

Appellant also asserts that the order is appealable pursuant to NRS 2.090(1). That statute provides, in pertinent part, that this court has jurisdiction over a “judgment in an action or proceeding, commenced in the district court.” A “judgment” is defined as an appealable order. NRAP 54(a). Appellant does not identify any statute or court rule authorizing an appeal from the challenged order. See *Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC*, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013) (this court “may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule”); *Moran v. Bonneville Square Assocs.*, 117 Nev. 525, 527, 25 P.3d 898, 899 (2001) (“[T]he burden rests squarely upon the shoulders of a party seeking to invoke our jurisdiction to establish, to our satisfaction, that this court does in fact have jurisdiction.”). Appellant therefore does not demonstrate that the order is appealable under NRS 2.090(1) or any other statute or court rule. Accordingly, we

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.


Parraguirre, J.


Bell


Stiglich, J.

cc: Hon. Tina Talim, District Judge
Gergis R. Ghobrial, M.D.
Greenberg Gross LLP
Eighth District Court Clerk

