


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

CHRISTOPHER ANTHONY JETER,
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

No. 86330

FILED

OCT 17 2024

ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY 
DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Kathleen E. Delaney, Judge. Appellant Christopher Anthony Jeter challenges counsel's performance regarding a revocation of probation. Having reviewed the briefing in this matter, the record on appeal, and the State's response to this court's order to clarify status, we recognize that Jeter has expired his sentence. This appeal is therefore moot. *See Newman v. State*, 132 Nev. 340, 341 n.1, 373 P.3d 855, 856 n.1 (2016) (deeming moot a probation revocation appeal where the underlying sentence has been discharged); *Personhood Nev. v. Bristol*, 126 Nev. 599, 601, 245 P.3d 572, 573 (2010) (dismissing appeal because it was moot).


Both the State and Jeter argue that the appeal presents a live controversy. The State, relying on *Martinez-Hernandez v. State*, 132 Nev. 623, 380 P.3d 861 (2016), argues that the appeal is not moot because the postconviction habeas petition was filed while Jeter was under a sentence of imprisonment. *Martinez-Hernandez* is distinguishable, however, as it involved a challenge to a judgment of conviction, not a revocation of probation. Thus, unlike in *Martinez-Hernandez*, the continuing collateral consequences of a conviction are not at issue here. *See id.* at 626-27, 380 P.3d at 863-64 (discussing the collateral consequences of a criminal

conviction that may exist notwithstanding completion of the sentence). And Jeter suggests that the appeal is not moot because his civil rights would be restored more quickly following discharge from probation than from parole, citing NRS 176A.850 and NRS 213.155. While Jeter does not address any specific right, the statutory timeframes for restoration of rights such as holding office or serving as a juror are the same for probation and parole. NRS 176A.850(4)(b)-(d); NRS 213.155(1)(a)-(c). Jeter also states without supporting cogent argument that the appeal presents an issue capable of repetition yet evading review. *Cf. Maresca v. State*, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (“It is appellant’s responsibility to present relevant authority and cogent argument; issues not so presented need not be addressed by this court.”). Because we are not convinced that either the State or Jeter has shown that the appeal is not moot, we

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.


_____, J.
Stiglich


_____, J.
Pickering


_____, J.
Parraguirre

cc: Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Judge
Laub Law
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk