

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DENNIS KEITH KIEREN, JR.,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA; CHARLES
DANIELS, DIRECTOR OF THE STATE
OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; AND RANDALL
GILMER, DIVISION OF PUBLIC
SAFETY OF THE OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL IN HIS
CAPACITY AS GENERAL COUNSEL
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Respondents.

No. 83509

FILED

OCT 14 2021


ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY *S. Young*
DEPUTY CLERK


ORDER DENYING PETITION

This original pro se petition for a writ of prohibition and mandamus challenges respondent's alleged restrictions on petitioner's ability to have documents notarized. Having considered the petition, we are not persuaded that our extraordinary intervention is warranted. *See* NRS 34.170; *Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*, 120 Nev. 222, 224, 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004) (noting that a writ of mandamus is proper only when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law and explaining that petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that writ relief is warranted). Petitioner has not provided this court with a copy of a district court order denying him writ relief in the first instance. *See* NRAP 21(a)(4) (providing the petitioner shall submit an appendix containing all documents "essential to understand the matters set forth in the petition").

Even assuming that the relief sought here could be properly obtained through a petition for writ relief, any application for such relief should be made to the district court in the first instance so that factual and legal issues are fully developed, giving this court an adequate record to review. *See Round Hill Gen. Imp. Dist. v. Newman*, 97 Nev. 601, 604, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981) (recognizing that “an appellate court is not an appropriate forum in which to resolve disputed questions of fact” and determining that when there are factual issues presented, this court will not exercise its discretion to entertain a petition for extraordinary relief even though “important public interests are involved”); *State v. Cty. of Douglas*, 90 Nev. 272, 276-77, 524 P.2d 1271, 1274 (1974) (noting that “this court prefers that such an application [for writ relief] be addressed to the discretion of the appropriate district court” in the first instance), *abrogated on other grounds by Attorney Gen. v. Gypsum Res.*, 129 Nev. 23, 33-34, 294 P.3d 404, 410-11 (2013). Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.


_____, C.J.
Hardesty


_____, J.
Parraguirre


_____, J.
Stiglich

cc: Dennis Keith Kieren, Jr.
Attorney General/Carson City