

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

MONA L. SNAPE,
Appellant,

vs.

MONT E. TANNER, AN INDIVIDUAL;
DAVID A. BOOKE, AN INDIVIDUAL;
RADEANE BLACKWELL, AN
INDIVIDUAL; JAMES BLACKWELL,
AN INDIVIDUAL; EASY LIVING
REALTY, A NEVADA CORPORATION;
AND LAW OFFICES OF MONT E.
TANNER, A NEVADA CORPORATION,
Respondents.

No. 37671

Affirmed

FILED

FEB 15 2002

JANETTE M. BLOOM
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY *J. Richard*
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

MONA L. SNAPE,
Petitioner,

vs.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK, AND THE HONORABLE
MARK R. DENTON, DISTRICT JUDGE,
Respondents,

and

MONT E. TANNER; DAVID A. BOOKE;
RADEANE BLACKWELL; JAMES
BLACKWELL; AND EASY LIVING
REALTY,
Real Parties in Interest.

No. 37654

*Petition
denied*

MONA L. SNAPE,
Petitioner,

vs.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK, AND THE HONORABLE
MARK R. DENTON, DISTRICT JUDGE,
Respondents,

and

MONT E. TANNER; DAVID A. BOOKE;
RADEANE BLACKWELL; JAMES
BLACKWELL; AND EASY LIVING
REALTY,
Real Parties in Interest.

No. 37797

*Petition
denied.*

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE AND DENIAL OF PETITIONS
FOR WRITS OF PROHIBITION

Before this court are a proper person appeal from a district court order denying appellant's motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction, and two original proper person petitions for writs of prohibition challenging district court orders finding petitioner in contempt and authorizing the Clark County Sheriff to remove petitioner from a mobile home.

"Generally the [district] court may or should dissolve an injunctive order which has been improperly issued or the continuance of

which is not justified in that it would work oppressively against the enjoined parties.”¹ The refusal to dissolve a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the district court and may not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.² Having reviewed the appellate record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction.

In regard to petitioner’s requests for extraordinary relief, a writ of prohibition may be issued to “arrest[] the proceedings of any tribunal . . . when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal.”³ “A petition for a writ of prohibition is addressed to the sound discretion of this court.”⁴ We have considered the petitions, and we are not satisfied that this court’s intervention by way of extraordinary relief is warranted.⁵ There has been no demonstration that the district court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in entering the contempt and removal orders.

¹43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 257, at 577 (1978).

²Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage, 342 P.2d 249, 252 (Cal. 1959); see also Clark Co. School Dist. v. Buchanan, 112 Nev. 1146, 1150, 924 P.2d 716, 719 (1996) (recognizing that “the granting of a preliminary injunction lies within the discretion of the district court”).

³NRS 34.320.


⁴Greene v. Dist. Ct., 115 Nev. 391, 393, 990 P.2d 184, 185 (1999).


⁵See NRAP 21(b).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order denying the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction, and we deny the petitions for writs of prohibition.

It is so ORDERED.⁶


_____, J.
Young


_____, J.
Agosti


_____, J.
Leavitt

cc: Hon. Mark R. Denton, District Judge
Mona L. Snape
Crosby & Turner
Mont E. Tanner
Clark County Clerk

⁶Although appellant/petitioner has not been granted permission to file documents in these matters in proper person, see NRAP 46(b), we have received and considered her proper person documents. We deny as moot the motions to expedite, to stay, to file briefs, to file documents in proper person, and to suspend the rules of appellate procedure.