IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

TERRY LEE HINES, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. No. 75979-COA

FILED

APR 18 2019

CLERK OF SOPREME COURT

BY

DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Terry Lee Hines appeals from an order of the district court denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on October 10, 2017. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Kathleen E. Delaney, Judge.

Hines filed his petition more than 27 years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal on March 13, 1990, see Hines v. State, Docket No. 19926 (Order Dismissing Appeal, February 20, 1990), and more than 24 years after the effective date of NRS 34.726, see 1991 Nev. Stat., ch. 44, § 5, at 75-76, § 33, at 92; Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 874-75, 34 P.3d 519, 529 (2001), abrogated on other grounds by Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. ____, ___ n.12, 423 P.3d 1084, 1097 n.12 (2018). Hines' petition was therefore untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Hines' petition was also successive. See NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2). Hines' petition was therefore procedurally barred

¹This appeal has been submitted for decision without oral argument. NRAP 34(f)(3).

²See Hines v. State, Docket No. 26164 (Order Dismissing Appeal, March 10, 1998); Hines v. State, Docket No. 22248 (Order Dismissing Appeal, June 26, 1991).

absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b). Further, because the State specifically pleaded laches, Hines was required to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the State. See NRS 34.800(2).

Hines claimed the decisions in Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. ____, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ____, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), provided good cause to overcome the procedural bars to his claim that he is entitled to the retroactive application of Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215, 994 P.2d 700 (2000). A claim of good cause must be raised within a reasonable time, Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 251, 71 P.3d 503, 505 (2003), but Hines' petition was filed more than one year from when Welch and Montgomery were decided. Hines offered no explanation for this delay and thus failed to demonstrate good cause. Moreover, as a separate and independent ground to deny relief, Welch and Montgomery would not have provided good cause to overcome the procedural bars. See Branham v. Warden, 134 Nev. ___, __, 434 P.3d 313, 316 (Ct. App. 2018).

Hines also claimed he could demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the procedural bars. A petitioner may overcome procedural bars by demonstrating he is actually innocent such that the failure to consider his petition would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. *Pellegrini*, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537. Hines claimed that "[t]he facts in this case established that [he] only committed a second-degree murder." This is not actual innocence, and Hines thus failed to overcome the procedural bars. *See Bousley v. United States*, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) ("[A]ctual innocence' means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency."). And because he failed to demonstrate a fundamental

miscarriage of justice, Hines failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the State. See NRS 34.800. Accordingly, we

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ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.3

Gibbons

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cc: Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Judge Terry Lee Hines Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

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³We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to appoint postconviction counsel. See NRS 34.750(1); Renteria-Novoa v. State, 133 Nev. 75, 76, 391 P.3d 760, 760-61 (2017).