IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

REX LEWIS ARTHUR,

Appellant,

vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

No. 36797

JAN 03 2002

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is a proper person appeal from an order of the district court denying a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

We have reviewed the record on appeal and for the reasons stated in the attached order of the district court, we conclude that the district court properly denied appellant's petition. Therefore, briefing and oral argument are not warranted in this case.¹ Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.²

J. J. Agosti J.

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cc: Hon. Lee A. Gates, District Judge Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Rex Lewis Arthur Clark County Clerk

¹See Luckett v. Warden, 91 Nev. 681, 682, 541 P.2d 910, 911 (1975).

²We have considered all proper person documents filed or received in this matter, and we conclude that the relief requested is not warranted.

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	1 2 3 4 5	ORDR STEWART L. BELL DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #000477 200 S. Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 455-4711 Attorney for Plaintiff FILED SEP 2 15 PM 00 SEP 2 15 PM 00 SEP 2 15 PM 00 SEP 2 15 PM 00 SEP 2 15 PM 00
	6	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
	7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
	8	Plaintiff,
	9	-vs-
	10	REX LEWIS ARTHUR, #0606475
	11	Defendant.
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	13	FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
	14	DATE OF HEARING: 8-10-00
	15	TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 A.M.
	16	THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable LEE GATES, Distric
	17	Judge, on the 10th day of August, 2000, the Petitioner not being present, in forma pauperis, th
	18	Respondent being represented by STEWART L. BELL, District Attorney, by and throug
	19	JAMES J. MILLER, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered th
	20	matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, and documents on file herein, nov
	21	therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
	22	FINDINGS OF FACT
	23	1. Rex L. Arthur, was married to, but living apart from Mrs. Pamela Arthur. Mr.
	24	Arthur had maintained contact with the defendant, but was residing at the Los Casitas Mobil
	25	Home Park, which she kept secret from Arthur. The victim in this case, Mr. Lawrenc
	26 18 18	Sharleville, also resided at the Los Casitas Mobile Home Park where he became friends wit
2000	E E	Mrs. Arthur.
и И И И		2. On the morning of June 2, 1995, Arthur arrived at Mrs. Arthur's mobile hom
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where an initial conversation commenced through the kitchen window, at which time Arthu
 asked Mrs. Arthur to allow him entrance into the mobile home. Mrs. Arthur refused. At about
 this time, Mr. Sharleville arrived at the mobile home because he and Mrs. Arthur had agreed t
 run errands together.

5 3. Arthur again asked for entrance into Mrs. Arthur's mobile home and asked her t 6 go with him somewhere else. While this conversation was occurring, Mr. Sharleville entere 7 the mobile home, locking the door behind him. After refusing Arthur entry into the mobile hom 8 repeatedly, Mrs. Arthur feared Arthur might try to break into the mobile home. She took the ke 9 out of the front door, and proceeded to the back of her trailer where she placed the key in 10 bathroom cupboard.

4. While Mrs. Arthur was in the bathroom, Arthur fired three gunshots into the doc
 from outside the trailer. At this point, Mrs. Arthur immediately dropped to the floor and yelle
 to Mr. Sharleville to do the same. Despite Mrs. Arthur's warning, Mr. Sharleville remained i
 the standing position where he attempted to call the police.

15 5. Immediately thereafter, while still lying on the floor, Mrs. Arthur looked up to se
16 Arthur standing inside the mobile home. Mrs. Arthur then heard three more gunshots fire
17 inside the trailer, resulting in Mr. Sharleville's death.

6. Having heard six shots, Mrs. Arthur assumed that there were no rounds left i
Arthur's gun and initiated a conversation with him. Mrs. Arthur then noticed that Mr. Sharlevil
was lying over the chair in front of her. She saw blood and noticed that Arthur had becon
upset. Mrs. Arthur then persuaded Arthur to put the gun down. Shortly thereafter, the polic
arrived and the defendant was arrested.

7. Arthur was indicted on Count I, Invasion of the Home While in Possession of
Firearm, Counts II and III, Discharging a Firearm at or Into an Occupied Structure, Count IV
Attempted Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Count V, Murder With Use of a Dead
Weapon.

8. Arthur filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on August 22, 1995. On Octob
28 2, 1995, the district court granted the writ as to Count III only and dismissed that count. C

-2-

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March 13, 1996, the State then filed an Amended Indictment charging Count I, First Degra
 Murder, Count II, Invasion of the Home While in Possession of a Firearm, and Count III, Assau
 with a Deadly Weapon.

9. On March 13, 1996, a Guilty Plea Agreement was filed in open court. Arthu 4 pleaded guilty, pursuant to negotiations, to First Degree Murder without Use of a Dead 5 Weapon and the parties stipulated to life with the possibility of parole under the old sentencir 6 statute with a ten-year eligibility for parole. Arthur also pleaded guilty to Invasion of the Hon 7 While in Possession of a Firearm and Assault With Use of a Deadly Weapon with any sentence 8 imposed on the Home Invasion to run consecutive to the murder and the parties were free 9 argue for concurrent or consecutive time for the assault count. The guilty plea as to the Assau 10 with Use of a Deadly Weapon was entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 2 11 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970). 12

13 10. Arthur then filed a pro per motion on May 15, 1996, to Dismiss Counse
14 Withdraw Guilty Plea(s), and Motion to Dismiss. This motion was heard on May 20, 1996,
15 which time the district judge ordered a psychiatric evaluation to be conducted to determin
16 Arthur's competency at the time of entering his guilty plea. The district court postponed futu
17 proceedings until this issue was resolved.

18 11. On June 19, 1996, two psychiatric evaluations were submitted. Both the defen and the prosecution agreed that the psychiatrists believe that the Arthur was competent. T district court then held the matter in abeyance until additional psychiatric reports were submitt to the court and ordered Arthur admitted to Lakes Crossing for that purpose. Arthur was se to Lakes Crossing not because psychiatrists found him incompetent, but rather for a mc thorough evaluation.

12. Arthur then returned from Lakes Crossing on September 30, 1996, at which tir
the district court found him competent and capable of assisting in his own defense. Also at tl
time, the district court judge granted the Public Defender's Motion to Withdraw and appoint
the State Public Defender to represent the defendant on October 2, 1996.

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13. On December 20, 1996, the State Public Defender filed a Motion to Withdra

-3-

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Guilty Plea. Arthur then retained private counsel, and on January 6, 1997, new private
 (appointed) counsel was substituted as counsel of record.

Arthur, on April 2, 1997, filed for an evidentiary hearing to determine the validit 3 14. 4 of the psychiatric evaluations. On May 16, 1997, an evidentiary hearing commenced, an continued for additional hearings held on June 10, 1997, June 27, 1997, and August 4, 1997 5 6 Psychiatric evidence was presented and Arthur's public defender also testified. The deput 7 public defender testified about discussing the plea negotiations with Arthur, about how muc time he would serve on all the sentences before becoming parole eligible approximately 11 t 8 9 14 years, that he spoke with additional witnesses that Arthur requested he talk to before Arthu 10 decided on whether to take the offer and that he believed that Arthur was fully aware of the consequences of pleading guilty to the charges. The deputy public defender further testified the 11 the answers to the district court judge's questions during the plea canvass, were Arthur's ow 12 words. Defense counsel explained that he would not have provided the answers for Arthur. 13

14 15. At a hearing on August 4, 1997, the district court denied the motion to withdravilation
15 plea. The district court found that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily given, that Arthu
16 understood the elements of the offenses and the consequences of the plea.

17 16. Arthur was then sentenced on August 18, 1997, to Count I - Life with th
18 Possibility of Parole; Count II, seven years to run consecutive to Count I; and Count III, fiv
19 years to run concurrent to Counts I and II with 809 days credit for time served.

20 17. On May 1, 1998, Arthur filed an appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court contendin
21 the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Nevada Suprem
22 Court dismissed the appeal on July 6, 1999. The Court stated:

The district court elicited from appellant at plea entry an unequivocal admission to committing the acts constituting the crimes. Further, appellant acknowledged understanding the constitutional rights set forth in the plea agreement, and confirmed that he wished to waive those rights. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the appellant was competent to enter his plea, in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. At the August 4 hearing, Arthur's deputy public defender testified about his

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understood the consequences of changing his plea. 4 Arthur filed this current Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) o 5 18. June 14, 2000. He again alleges that he was not competent to understand the elements of th 6 offenses for which he was charged. Arthur contends that because of this lack of understandin 7 of the elements of the offenses, he did not appreciate that the state would not be able to prov 8 all the elements of the offenses, i.e., he could not be guilty of home invasion and felony murde 9 because he could not break into a home he owned as community property with his wife. Arthu 10 also asserts that the plea canvass was inadequate in that the court failed to determine the factu-11 basis. Finally, Arthur asserts that defense counsel, apparently all three that represented him 12 various stages, were ineffective because they failed to inform him about the insufficiencies (13 the change of plea, what actual sentence he would receive and failed to raise all these issues c 14 15 appeal.

discussions with Arthur regarding the plea

negotiations and the consequences of either accepting or rejecting the offer. The Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in finding Arthur was competent and

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A defendant may challenge the validity of his guilty plea by raising it either in
 motion to withdraw plea or in a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. <u>Bryant</u>
 <u>State</u>, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986). Arthur chose to file a motion to withdra
 his plea back in 1997.

2. In <u>Hart v. State</u>, ____ Nev. ___, 1 P.3d 969 (2000), the Nevada Supreme Cou
affirmed the availability of a motion to withdraw plea. The Court stated that a post-conviction
petition for writ of habeas corpus had not subsumed the motion, but that either may be used
challenge the validity of a change of plea. <u>Id.</u> at 971-72. However, the Court went on to place
some limitations on the motion.

[W]here a defendant previously has sought relief from the judgment, the defendant's failure to identify all grounds for relief in the first instance should weigh against consideration of the successive motion.

-5-

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We recognize that similar concerns underlie the procedural default rules of NRS chapter 34. Generally, a defendant must show cause and prejudice for filing an untimely or a successive petition.

<u>Id.</u> at 972.

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Nevada Revised Statute 34.801(3) and Phelps v. Director, 104 Nev. 565, 764 P.2
1303 (1988), imposes the burden upon Arthur of proving specific facts that demonstrate goc cause for his failure to present these claims in the earlier proceedings and showing actu prejudice to himself by the manner in which his plea and/or direct appeal were conducte Arthur has failed to present any reason for not raising these claims in his original motion withdraw plea. Therefore, these issues are waived.

4. Arthur claimed in his direct appeal that his plea was involuntarily and unknowing
entered because he was unable to understand the elements of the offense. These issues a
barred by the law of the case doctrine and will not be considered. Dawson v. State, 108 Ne
112, 825 P.2d 593 (1992) (court will not address issue it had rejected as merit less); Bejarno
State, 106 Nev. 840, 801 P.2d 1388 (1990)(a prior ruling is the law of the case and will not l
disturbed); Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 535 P.2d 797 (1975) (the first ruling became the law the case and the defendant could not later revive the issue).

5. The United States Supreme Court in <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 1(S.Ct. 2052 (1984), established the standard to use in order to determine when counsel assistance is so ineffective that it violates the Sixth Amendment of the United Stat Constitution. <u>Strickland</u> laid out a two-pronged test to decide the merits of a defendant's clai of ineffective assistance of counsel:

> First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both

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showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

3 Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.

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6. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that "claims of ineffective assistance o 4 counsel must be reviewed under the 'reasonably effective assistance' standard articulated by th 5 [United States Supreme] Court in Strickland, . . . which requires a defendant to show that 6 counsel's assistance was 'deficient' and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense." Bennett v 7 8 State, 111 Nev. 1099, 1108, 901 P.2d 676, 682 (1995). "In meeting the 'prejudice' requirement 9 the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. ... 'A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 10 undermine confidence in the outcome." Kirksev v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102 11 1107 (1996). 12

7. In <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984), the Nevada 13 Supreme Court held that a defendant is not entitled to relief based primarily on "naked" o 14 15 "bare" allegations or those belied or repelled by the record. The record belies Arthur's claim tha 16 the Presentence Investigation Report contained errors. Arthur agrees he left the trailer area, wen out to the street and returned. In addition, the report accurately reflects that his wife was behind 17 Mr. Sharleville. The district court was well aware that Arthur claimed that he was not trying to 18 19 harm his wife, which is why the court accepted an Alford plea as to the assault charge. The 20 court was not left with any inaccurate picture of what happened from the report. Arthur ha 21 failed to meet his burden of showing that these were in fact inaccurate statements and therefore has failed to show that his state public defender was incompetent for not raising these issue 22 during sentencing. 23

8. The same reasoning applies to appellate counsel's failure to raise similar claim
on appeal. There were no inaccurate statements. Even if the report's statements were
inaccurate, the district court sentenced Arthur to according to the terms of the plea agreement
Arthur cannot establish that if these issues were raised on appeal there would have been a
different outcome.

-7-

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As to the claim that certain issues should have been raised on appeal, appellat 9. 1 counsel raised the only issues that seemed appropriate -- whether Arthur was competent t 2 3 understand the elements of the offenses and whether Arthur's plea was entered voluntarily an unknowingly. It is well within the discretion of appellate counsel to determine which issue 4 should be raised on appeal. Strategy or decisions regarding the conduct of defendant's case ar 5 "virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances." Doleman v. State, 112 Nev 6 843, 848, 921 P.2d 278, 280 (1996) (quoting Howard v. State, 106 Nev. 713, 722, 800 P.2d 175 7 8 180 (1990)).

9 10. In order to prove that appellate counsel's performance was ineffective, a defendar
10 must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success on appea
11 See Duhamel v. Collins, 955 F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1992); Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 113
12 (11th Cir. 1991). The Nevada Supreme Court has fully addressed the issue of Arthur'
13 competency and determined that the plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly. Arthur has no
14 met his burden of showing that appellate counsel failed to raise an issue that would have bee
15 successful on appeal.

ORDER

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BY

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hief Depaty District Attorney

Nevada Bar #000047

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17 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Arthur's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post 18 Conviction) be DENIED. day of August, 2000. 19 DATED this 20 21 SC 22 BEI LEE A. GATES 23 TOR ΈY Nevada ar #0.004 24 25

-8-

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