

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

D. V. & G. CORPORATION, INC., A
NEVADA CORPORATION, AND
VIOLET KELLER,
Appellants,
vs.
JOHN E. TAYLOR, JR.,
Respondent.

No. 36736

FILED

JAN 22 2002

JANETTE M. BLOOM
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY *J. Richards*
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying respondent's motion for attorney fees and denying leave to file supplemental points and authorities.

Our preliminary review of the documents submitted to this court, pursuant to NRAP 3(e), revealed a potential jurisdictional defect. Specifically, it appeared that appellants were not aggrieved parties with standing to appeal, as the district court denied respondent's motion for attorney fees, because respondent had not demonstrated that the fees were reasonable.¹ Thus, on December 7, 2001, this court filed an order directing appellants to show cause why this court has jurisdiction over this appeal.

On January 4, 2002, we received appellants' response. Appellants contend they are aggrieved by the district court's August 10, 2000 order denying respondent's motion for attorney fees and denying


¹The district court later granted respondent's motion and awarded attorney fees on October 31, 2000. Appellants have filed an appeal in that matter (Docket No. 37002). In light of this order, we deny as moot the July 20, 2001 stipulated motion to consolidate this appeal with Docket No. 37002.


leave to file supplemental points and authorities, because the district court characterized the order as one warranting an award of reasonable attorney fees. Moreover, appellants state that they appealed from the August 10, 2000 order so as "to avoid waiving any rights of review" with respect to the district court's subsequent October 31, 2000 order awarding respondent attorney fees.

Only an aggrieved party has standing to appeal.² As explained previously, a party is "aggrieved" within the meaning of NRAP 3A(a) when either a personal right or right of property is adversely and substantially affected by a district court's ruling.³ Here, the district court denied respondent's motion for attorney fees in the August 10, 2000 order. Thus, appellants are not aggrieved within the meaning of NRAP 3A(a) by the district court's August 10, 2000 order. Therefore, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, we

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.


_____, J.
Shearing


_____, J.
Rose


_____, J.
Becker

²See NRAP 3A(a); Valley Bank of Nevada v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 446, 874 P.2d 729, 734 (1994).

³Estate of Hughes v. First Nat'l Bank, 96 Nev. 178, 605 P.2d 1149 (1980).

cc: Hon. Steven P. Elliott, District Judge
Jenkins & Carter
Hale Lane Peek Dennison Howard & Anderson/Reno
Washoe County Clerk