

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LAWANDA COX,
Appellant,
vs.
DOUGLAS W. COX,
Respondent.

No. 71381

FILED

DEC 28 2017

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

ELIZABETH J. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY *[Signature]*
DEPUTY CLERK

Lawanda Cox appeals from a district court divorce decree. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; Linda Marquis, Judge.

Respondent Douglas W. Cox filed his complaint for divorce in March of 2015. Following a bench trial in March of 2016, the district court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decision in this matter. Among other findings, the district court found that Douglas was in a much better financial condition than Lawanda, that Douglas' current income was \$3,032.89 a month while Lawanda's was none, and that Lawanda should receive alimony in conformity with NRS 125.150 in the amount of \$500.00 a month. The court also divided four separate properties, respectively the Harmony residence, the Meadview lots, the Mohave Lots, and the Watkins residence, between the parties. Recognizing that Lawanda had introduced sufficient evidence to establish that the Meadview lots and the Watkins residence were her separate property, the district court then awarded Douglas the Harmony residence and Lawanda received the Mohave lots as an equal division of the community property. The district court's decision further awarded Lawanda primary physical custody of the couple's teenage son, with the couple sharing joint legal custody. Douglas received parenting

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time with his son to commence following the completion of ongoing court-ordered reunification therapy.

Lawanda moved for reconsideration of the decision, and the court entered its order on the motion for reconsideration following another hearing.¹ Lawanda then appealed to this court, but her appellate briefing does not contain any actual arguments and instead simply lists out the following issues on appeal without providing any explanation or discussion on these points: alimony, community property distribution, judgment orders in favor of Douglas, teenage discretion, and misrepresentation of facts by Douglas and his counsel.

This court reviews alimony, division of property, and child custody determinations under an abuse of discretion standard. *Wolff v. Wolff*, 112 Nev. 1355, 1359, 929 P.2d 916, 918-19 (1996); *Wallace v. Wallace*, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996). It is well established that appellate courts need not consider issues that are not cogently argued. *Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest.*, 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). And as noted above, Lawanda's appellate briefing contains no actual arguments explaining why she believes the district court's decisions relating to alimony, division of property, and child custody² are erroneous or otherwise unsupportable.

¹Lawanda's motion for reconsideration tolled the time to appeal from the divorce decision, and we treat her appeal as a timely challenge to the terms of the decision and any relevant amendments upon reconsideration. See *AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington*, 126 Nev. 578, 585, 245 P.3d 1190, 1194-95 (2010).

²A court decision regarding parenting time or visitation subject to teen discretion is a child custody issue. See *Wallace*, 112 Nev. at 1019, 922 P.2d at 543.


While Lawanda does expound on these and other points to some degree in her docketing statement, the inclusion of arguments in this document, rather than in her appellate briefing, is improper. See NRAP 14(a)(4) (providing that the docketing statement “is not binding on the [appellate] court and the parties’ briefs will determine the final issues on appeal”); cf. NRAP 28(e)(2) (stating that appellate briefs “shall not incorporate by reference briefs or memoranda of law submitted to the district court or refer the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals to such briefs or memoranda for the arguments on the merits of the appeal”). Moreover, even if we were to consider these arguments, to the extent that they address appealable determinations, they are likewise not sufficiently developed to allow us to evaluate whether they provide a basis for reversing the district court’s decisions and we therefore decline to consider these points. *Edwards*, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38.

Based on the forgoing analysis, we conclude Lawanda has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in deciding the underlying case. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.



_____, C.J.
Silver



_____, J.
Tao



_____, J.
Gibbons

cc: Hon. Linda Marquis, District Judge, Family Court Division
Lawanda Cox
Douglas W. Cox
Eighth District Court Clerk