

required by NRS 41.280(1)¹ and because the only action that he otherwise took in furtherance of his case was filing the document described above. With regard to that document, the district court found, among other things, that it was unrelated to the underlying petition and improper, and, based on that finding, the court struck it from the record, relying once again on its inherent authority. And because the district court further found that Tagle improperly filed the document to harass the individuals identified above and to impose additional work or expenses on the court, it also referred Tagle to NDOC for forfeiture of deductions of time that he had earned to reduce his prison sentence. To support that decision, the district court cited NRS 209.451(1)(d)(1), which states that an inmate forfeits deductions of time from his or her sentence when he or she files a pleading, motion, or other document in a civil case that presents a claim or defense for an improper purpose. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Tagle challenges the district court's decision in this matter, asserting that the court punished him for various improper reasons, which ranged from his race to the legibility of his handwriting. Insofar as Tagle's challenge is directed at the portion of the district court's order dismissing his petition, we discern no basis for relief. In particular, nothing in the district court's order, or even the record on appeal, suggests that the court relied on any of the improper bases identified by Tagle as a ground for

¹After Tagle filed his petition, NRS 41.280 was amended twice, see 2017 Nev. Stat., ch. 107, § 1, at 472 (effective May 24, 2017); 2017 Nev. Stat., ch. 132, § 2, at 607 (effective July 1, 2017), but those amendments do not affect the disposition of this appeal.

dismissing his petition. To the contrary, the district court expressly stated in its order that it was dismissing Tagle's case for want of prosecution under its inherent authority, and the court made the specific findings set forth above to support its determination that Tagle failed to prosecute his action. *See Hunter v. Gang*, 132 Nev. ___, ___, 377 P.3d 448, 454-55 (Ct. App. 2016) (concluding that the district court may rely on its inherent authority to dismiss a case for want of prosecution, without having to justify its reliance on that authority, even where the two-year-period set forth in NRCP 41(e) has not elapsed).

In this regard, Tagle does not dispute any of the district court's findings or specifically challenge the court's exercise of its inherent authority under these circumstances. Instead, Tagle simply asserts that the district court itself failed to take any action with regard to his petition until it entered its dismissal order; that he inquired multiple times as to the status of his case; and that, as a pro se party in the underlying proceeding, he was unfamiliar with the law. But nothing in the record demonstrates that Tagle ever requested that his petition be set for a hearing. *Cf.* 7 JDCR 4(6) (authorizing uncontested name change petitions to be set for a hearing upon counsel's request). And while Tagle proceeded pro se below, he was nevertheless required to comply with court rules. *See Gleash v. Yuswak*, 308 F.3d 758, 761 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Even pro se litigants must follow the rules."); *see also Bonnell v. Lawrence*, 128 Nev. 394, 404, 282 P.3d 712, 718 (2012) (citing *Gleash* with approval). Given the foregoing, we conclude that Tagle failed to demonstrate that the district court grossly abused its discretion by dismissing his petition for want of prosecution. *See Hunter*,

132 Nev. at ___, 377 P.3d at 455 (recognizing that dismissals for want of prosecution are reviewed for a gross abuse of discretion).²

To the extent that Tagle asserts that the district court punished him for the various improper purposes identified in his informal brief, his assertion may also be directed at the portion of the district court's order referring him to NDOC for forfeiture of the deductions of time that he had earned to reduce his prison sentence. But once again, nothing in the district court's order indicates that it relied on any of the improper bases identified by Tagle in reaching this decision. Instead the district court specifically found that Tagle improperly filed a document to harass third parties or to impose additional work or expense on the court, and Tagle does not dispute that finding or otherwise argue that NRS 209.451(1)(d)(1) did not support the court's decision. As a result, Tagle failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by referring him to NDOC for forfeiture of his deductions of time. *See Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.*, 126 Nev. 243, 249, 235 P.3d 592, 596 (2010) (reviewing a district court's decision

²And for that reason, we further conclude that Tagle's arguments are moot to the extent that they are directed at the portion of the district court's order striking his document that requested for the court to disregard filings from certain individuals. *See Personhood Nev. v. Bristol*, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010) (explaining that appellate courts generally will not consider moot issues).

to impose a sanction for an abuse of discretion). Given the foregoing, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.³

Silver, C.J.
Silver

Tao, J.
Tao

Gibbons, J.
Gibbons

cc: Hon. Gary Fairman, District Judge
Victor Tagle, Sr.
White Pine County Clerk

³Although we have considered the documents that Tagle filed with this court on August 18 and September 15, 2017, we deny any relief requested therein.