
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RAFAEL AMAYA, INDIVIDUALLY; MIRIAN E. RUANO-PALENCIA, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR BEVERLY AMAYA, A MINOR; MARIAN E. RUANO-PALENCIA, AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR ABIGAIL AMAYA, A MINOR; AND MARIAN E. RUANO-PALENCIA, AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR YOSELIN AMAYA, A MINOR, Appellants, vs. JOSE C. RUTIAGA-LOPEZ, INDIVIDUALLY, Respondent.




ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court order dismissing a tort action for failure to timely serve process. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Gloria Sturman, Judge.

Under NRCP 4(i), a district court is required to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint if the plaintiff fails to serve a defendant with process within 120 days of filing the complaint and fails to move for an enlargement of the time for service. See NRCP 4(i) ("[T]he action shall be dismissed . . . unless the party on whose behalf such service was required files a motion to enlarge the time for service"); Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 126 Nev. ____, 245 P.3d 1198, 1200-01 (2010) (recognizing that NRCP 4(i) differs from its federal counterpart in that NRCP 4(i) not only requires a plaintiff to show good cause for failing to timely serve process, but also requires a plaintiff to file a motion to enlarge the time for service.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA service of process on respondent within 120 days¹ nor filed a motion to enlarge the time for service, the district court properly dismissed appellants' complaint. NRCP 4(i); *Saavedra-Sandoval*, 126 Nev. at _____, 245 P.3d at 1200 (explaining that this court reviews a district court order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve process for an abuse of discretion). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.



 cc: Hon. Gloria Sturman, District Judge Carolyn Worrell, Settlement Judge Ralph A. Schwartz, P.C. Hutchison & Steffen, LLC Eighth District Court Clerk

¹Appellants' suggestion that they substantially complied with NRS 14.070(2)'s substitute-service provision lacks merit. Under NRS 14.070(2), service is deemed sufficient if, in addition to providing a copy of the process with the required fee to the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, the plaintiff (1) sends notice of service and a copy of the process to the defendant's address by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested; and (2) files in the district court the original process, a return receipt of the mailing, and an affidavit stating that the plaintiff has complied with these steps. When NRCP 4(i)'s 120-day time frame elapsed on August 31, 2012, the record demonstrates that neither of these requirements had been attempted. Consequently, appellants cannot reasonably contend that they substantially complied with NRS 14.070(2).

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