

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LISA S. MYERS-GAMBINI,  
Appellant,  
vs.  
PAUL A. GAMBINI,  
Respondent.

No. 56426

**FILED**

APR 07 2011

TRACIE K. LINDEMAN  
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT  
BY [Signature]  
DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE


This is a proper person appeal from a district court post-divorce decree order denying appellant's NRCP 60(b) motion for relief. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; William B. Gonzalez, Judge.


Having considered appellant's civil proper person appeal statement and the district court record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely appellant's NRCP 60(b) motion. Cook v. Cook, 112 Nev. 179, 912 P.2d 264 (1996) (providing that the district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny an NRCP 60(b) motion); NRCP 60(b) (requiring that an NRCP 60(b) motion to set aside for mistake or inadvertence must "be made within a reasonable time, and . . . not more than 6 months after the proceeding . . . or the date that written notice of entry of the judgment or order was served"); Union Petrochemical Corp. v. Scott, 96 Nev. 337, 339, 609 P.2d 323, 324 (1980) (recognizing that a lack of diligence in moving to set aside a judgment is sufficient for denial of the motion). Here, the district court issued its order on August 8, 2008, and written notice of the order's entry was served on August 18, 2008. Appellant's NRCP 60(b) motion for relief was not filed until June 2009. Thus, the district court properly found that


appellant's 60(b) motion was untimely and denied her relief on that basis, and therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.<sup>1</sup>

  
Gibbons, J.

  
Cherry, J.

  
Pickering, J.

cc: Hon. William B. Gonzalez, District Judge, Family Court Division  
Lisa S. Myers-Gambini  
Paul A. Gambini  
Eighth District Court Clerk

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<sup>1</sup>Having considered appellant's remaining challenges to other orders, we conclude that reversal is not warranted because her remaining challenges either lack merit or are not properly before this court.