

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

AARON ESTRADA,  
Appellant,  
vs.  
THE STATE OF NEVADA,  
Respondent.

No. 55774

FILED

SEP 29 2010

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ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE


This is an appeal from a district court order denying appellant Aaron Estrada's post-conviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Michael Villani, Judge.


Estrada contends that the district court erred by denying his post-conviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We conclude that because the motion was filed five-and-one-half years after entry of the judgment of conviction, Estrada was aware of the facts relating to his claims, and the State specifically alleged prejudice due to the lengthy delay, the district court should have applied the equitable doctrine of laches and declined to consider the motion on its merits. See Hart v. State, 116 Nev. 558, 563-64, 1 P.3d 969, 972 (2000); Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) (this court will affirm the judgment of the district court if it reached the correct result for the wrong reason).


Moreover, as a separate and independent ground to affirm the denial of the motion, we conclude that Estrada failed to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel);

Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting Strickland test), and has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by finding that the guilty plea was knowingly and intelligently entered, see Hubbard v. State, 110 Nev. 671, 675, 877 P.2d 519, 521 (1994). Contrary to Estrada's claim, his age did not render him legally incompetent to enter into a guilty plea agreement. See NRS 62A.030(2)(a) (a person who is excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is not a "child"); cf. Robinson v. State, 110 Nev. 1137, 1138, 881 P.2d 667, 668 (1994) (once a child is certified as an adult, he "is no longer a child in the eyes of the criminal law"); see also People v. Mortera, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782, 784 (Ct. App. 1993). Further, we decline at this time to require the district courts to perform a specialized colloquy or mandate parental involvement when accepting guilty pleas from juvenile defendants. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

  
\_\_\_\_\_, J.  
Cherry

  
\_\_\_\_\_, J.  
Saitta

  
\_\_\_\_\_, J.  
Gibbons

cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge  
The Eighth District Court Clerk  
Kirk T. Kennedy  
Attorney General/Carson City  
Clark County District Attorney