

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

AARON L. TEMPLE, AN INDIVIDUAL,  
FIDUCIARY ON BEHALF OF CCD  
TEMPLE, LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED  
LIABILITY COMPANY; AND TEMPLE  
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, A  
NEVADA CORPORATION,  
Petitioners,

vs.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT  
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,  
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF  
CLARK, AND THE HONORABLE  
ELIZABETH GOFF GONZALEZ,  
DISTRICT JUDGE,  
Respondents,  
and  
NEVADA STATE BANK,  
Real Party in Interest.

No. 54386

**FILED**

**OCT 08 2009**

TRACIE K. LINDEMAN  
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT  
BY S. Young  
DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

This original proper person petition for a writ of mandamus challenges a purported judgment and possibly an order refusing to set aside the judgment.<sup>1</sup> We have considered this petition, and we are not satisfied that this court's intervention by way of extraordinary relief is warranted at this time. NRAP 21(b)(1); Smith v. District Court, 107 Nev. 674, 818 P.2d 849 (1991). In particular, NRAP 21(a) requires that a

<sup>1</sup>The petition was filed by petitioner Aaron Temple in proper person, purportedly on behalf of Temple Development Corporation and CCD Temple, LLC, as well as himself individually. But a corporation or limited liability company may not be represented by a nonlawyer. See, e.g., Salman v. Newell, 110 Nev. 1333, 1336, 885 P.2d 607, 608 (1994). Accordingly, the petition is dismissed as to Temple Development Corporation and CCD Temple, LLC.

petition include copies of documents and parts of the record necessary to an understanding of the matter; petitioner failed to provide copies of the challenged orders or any documents filed in the underlying case other than his challenges to the judgment. Without sufficient documentation, we cannot evaluate the petition's merits. Pan v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 88 P.3d 840 (2004). Also, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment, NRAP 3A(b)(1), and from an order refusing to set aside a judgment. NRAP 3A(b)(8); Holiday Inn v. Barnett, 103 Nev. 60, 732 P.2d 1376 (1987). An appeal is an adequate legal remedy precluding extraordinary writ relief. NRS 34.170; Pan, 120 Nev. 222, 88 P.3d 840. Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.<sup>2</sup>

Cherry, J.  
Cherry

Douglas, J.  
Douglas

Gibbons, J.  
Gibbons

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<sup>2</sup>We deny petitioner's motion for stay. We also note that petitioner has apparently filed a bankruptcy petition. As this writ petition is an original proceeding in this court initiated by petitioner, and not an action by a creditor to collect a debt from petitioner, we conclude that our disposition does not violate the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). See Koolik v. Markowitz, 40 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Way, 229 B.R. 11 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1998).

cc: Hon. Elizabeth Goff Gonzalez, District Judge  
Aaron L. Temple  
Holland & Hart LLP/Las Vegas  
Eighth District Court Clerk