

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

OMAR ROBLES,
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

No. 47354

FILED

SEP 09 2008

TRACEE K. LINDEMAN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY *[Signature]*
DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, entered upon jury verdicts, finding appellant Omar Robles guilty of battery with use of a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder with use of a deadly weapon, first-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon, and carrying a concealed weapon. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Stewart L. Bell, Judge.

FACTS

On August 21, 2001, Ricardo Barragan, David Mayo and Mayo's girlfriend, April Neeley, were dealing narcotics at an apartment complex in Las Vegas. At some point during the afternoon, the appellant, Omar Robles, approached the group, pointed a gun at Barragan, and demanded money and narcotics. When Barragan turned away to reach into a car, Robles struck him in the face with a gun. Barragan then retrieved his own gun, and the pair fired shots at one another before Robles fled the scene.

Several days later, on August 24, 2001, Barragan, Mayo and Neeley were again dealing narcotics at the complex. Nazarios Rios-Olivera, the complex owner, was nearby with his daughter, putting away his children's bicycles. Robles and another man, each of whom were carrying guns, entered the complex grounds and began firing towards

Barragan. They fled after firing eight to twelve shots. Barragan was wounded in the thigh. A shot also hit Olivera, fatally wounding him.

Police arrived shortly thereafter, and worked continuously for the next few hours. As he was completing his investigation, LVMPD Officer Thomas Kern saw Robles running in the direction of Barragan's apartment, attempting to retrieve something from his pants pocket. Officer Kern ordered Robles to stop, but Robles did not comply until he reached a car, where his lower half was hidden from view. He then raised his hands, turned around, ran back to his vehicle, and drove away. When Officer Kern approached the car Robles had stood behind, he found a handgun that had not been there previously. Using a license plate number copied by Officer Kern, LVMPD officers eventually located Robles and arrested him for possession of a concealed weapon.

Barragan later identified Robles as the person involved in the August 21 battery and the August 24 battery and shooting. While in custody at the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC) awaiting trial, Robles implicitly acknowledged shooting Olivera in a telephone conversation with his mother regarding his theory of defense. In a conversation with other acquaintances, Robles also made threatening statements regarding a potential trial witness who was also housed at CCDC.

The State ultimately charged Robles with battery with use of a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder with use of a deadly weapon, first-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon and carrying a concealed weapon. A jury convicted Robles of all charges. Robles appeals.

DISCUSSION

Robles argues, among other claims, that the district court erred in (1) restricting his ability to question Mayo regarding prior criminal convictions; (2) excluding a transcript of a 911 call identifying “two black males” as suspects in the August 24 shooting; and (3) admitting phone conversations intercepted while Robles was in pretrial custody. We address each of these claims below.

Mayo’s habitual offender eligibility and prior criminal convictions

Robles first argues that the district court erred in limiting his ability to cross-examine Mayo and present extrinsic evidence regarding several of Mayo’s prior criminal convictions and bad acts, and in restricting his ability to question Mayo regarding his potential habitual offender status. We agree that this was error, but conclude that it was harmless.

“Trial courts have [wide] discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence.”¹ Therefore, this court reviews decisions to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.² In addition, courts also enjoy “wide discretion to control cross-examination that attacks a witness’s general credibility.”³ However, when the proffered evidence or line of questioning relates to any bias or motive of the witness in testifying, this discretion is “narrowed,” and “the only proper restriction should be [upon] inquiries which are repetitive,

¹Atkins v. State, 112 Nev. 1122, 1127, 923 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1996).

²See id.

³Lobato v. State, 120 Nev. 512, 520, 96 P.3d 765, 771 (2004).

irrelevant, vague, speculative, or designed merely to harass, annoy or humiliate the witness.”⁴

Generally, “[i]mpeachment by use of extrinsic evidence is prohibited when collateral to the proceedings.”⁵ With respect to prior acts or conduct, NRS 50.085(3) specifically provides that:

Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, if relevant to truthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness himself or on cross-examination of a witness who testifies to an opinion of his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, subject to the general limitations upon relevant evidence and the limitations upon interrogation and subject to the provisions of NRS 50.090.

However, NRS 50.095 additionally provides that for the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of any criminal conviction punishable by more than one year imprisonment may be admitted, so long as not more than ten years has lapsed since the witness was released or his parole expired.

In addition, the collateral fact rule has only limited application. As this court noted in Lobato v. State, “extrinsic evidence relevant to prove a witness’s motive to testify in a certain way, i.e., bias,

⁴Id. (quoting Bushnell v. State, 95 Nev. 570, 573, 599 P.2d 1038, 1040 (1979)).

⁵Id. at 518, 96 P.3d at 770.

interest, corruption or prejudice, is never collateral to the controversy and not subject to the limitations contained in NRS 50.085(3).”⁶

In this case, Robles sought to cross-examine Mayo regarding his eligibility for conviction as a habitual offender, even though he had never been formally adjudicated as such. He also sought to admit evidence and cross-examine Mayo regarding a number of prior convictions, including two 1981 felony convictions for receiving stolen property, 1984 and 1987 felony theft convictions, three 1987 felony forgery convictions, a 2000 gross misdemeanor conviction for attempted theft, and a 2002 grand larceny felony conviction. The district court allowed Robles to refer to the 2002 and 2000 convictions, but excluded any examination related to the earlier felonies, or to Mayo’s habitual offender eligibility. We address each of these determinations below.

Habitual offender eligibility

Robles asserts that due to Mayo’s history of convictions, he was made aware at his waiver of preliminary hearing for his 2002 grand larceny convictions that he was eligible for adjudication as a habitual felon and a habitual petit-larcenist pursuant to NRS 207.010, NRS 207.012 and NRS 207.014. According to Robles, Mayo was sentenced for his 2002 grand larceny conviction shortly after he gave testimony at Robles’ preliminary hearing. However, despite Mayo’s eligibility, the State never prosecuted him as a habitual criminal.

Because Mayo was not formally adjudicated a habitual offender, evidence of his potential eligibility is not admissible under NRS

⁶120 Nev. at 519, 96 P.3d at 770.

50.095. Even so, Robles asserts that he should have been able to present evidence related to Mayo's eligibility as a habitual offender, and the State's failure to prosecute him as such, as proof that Mayo was inherently biased in favor of the State in his testimony against Robles. Specifically, Robles argues that even though Mayo received no formal benefit from the State in exchange for his testimony, he had reason to believe that he would receive some sort of advantage as a result of his cooperation.

Recently, in Lobato, we examined a case in which a jailhouse witness contacted the district attorney's office regarding incriminating statements made by Lobato during her pretrial confinement and provided the police with a detailed statement describing their conversations.⁷ In exchange for her cooperation, the witness requested a letter of recommendation to the parole board, but received nothing.⁸ The witness also made attempts to get released from jail due to a "high risk" pregnancy, and wrote a letter to a former co-prisoner, asking her to falsely state that she was the witness's former employer and copy and send an enclosed recommendation letter to the parole board in her own handwriting.⁹ At trial, the district court denied Lobato's request to submit the evidence related to the letters written by the witness to her co-prisoner as proof of the witness's bias, reasoning that the evidence was barred under the collateral fact rule.¹⁰ This court reversed, concluding that the

⁷120 Nev. at 516, 96 P.3d at 768.

⁸Id.

⁹Id. at 516-17, 96 P.3d at 768-69.

¹⁰Id. at 517, 96 P.3d at 769.

letters and the witness's cooperation were part of a "continuum of deceptions taken to secure her freedom," and were, therefore, admissible to demonstrate the witness's bias in cooperating with the State during Lobato's trial and possible motivation to give false testimony.¹¹

As in Lobato, we conclude that in this case, the fact that Mayo was eligible for conviction as a habitual offender, but was never prosecuted as such, indicates that Mayo had incentive to cooperate with the State and to testify falsely against Robles. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in restricting Robles' ability to cross-examine Mayo or to present any extrinsic evidence regarding his habitual offender eligibility.

Prior criminal convictions

Robles also contends that the district court erred in restricting his ability to cross-examine Mayo regarding certain criminal convictions older than ten years. Specifically, Robles takes issue with the district court's exclusion of questioning related to Mayo's 1984 and 1987 felony theft convictions and a series of three 1987 felony forgery convictions. As Robles concedes, NRS 50.095 does not allow the admission of extrinsic evidence related to these convictions, because they are more than ten years old. However, Robles argues that he was nonetheless entitled to cross-examine Mayo regarding these specific instances of misconduct under NRS 50.085(3), which has no set time limit. We agree.

In Butler v. State, we held that even in instances where NRS 50.095 does not provide for the admission of extrinsic evidence of a

¹¹Id. at 520, 96 P.3d at 769.

criminal conviction, counsel may still cross-examine a witness regarding a prior conviction pursuant to NRS 50.085(3), if the crime involved dishonesty or related to the truthfulness of a witness.¹² Thus, this court concluded that the district court did not err in allowing cross-examination related to a witness's misdemeanor attempted forgery conviction, even though the conviction was not a felony admissible under NRS 50.095.¹³

We conclude that the reasoning in Butler is analogous to this case. Mayo's three 1987 forgery convictions and his earlier theft convictions all tend to demonstrate Mayo's propensity for dishonesty and untruthfulness as a witness. Therefore, the district court erred in not allowing Robles to cross-examine Mayo regarding these convictions pursuant to NRS 50.085(3).

Harmless error analysis

Despite these errors, we conclude that the restriction of cross-examination regarding Mayo's prior convictions, as well as the restriction of evidence related to Mayo's habitual offender eligibility, was harmless. NRS 178.598 directs that any error that does not affect a defendant's substantial rights must be disregarded. As indicated in Tavares v. State, the test to determine if error is harmless is whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."¹⁴ [PK1]

¹²120 Nev. 879, 890-91, 102 P.3d 71, 79-80 (2004).

¹³Id.

¹⁴117 Nev. 725, 732, 30 P.3d 1128, 1132 (2001) (quoting Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). We note that both NRS 178.598 and the Kotteakos standard apply to error of a nonconstitutional dimension. See

continued on next page . . .

As Robles argues, Mayo's testimony was important to the State's case against Robles, as he witnessed the shooting of Rios and Barragan and Robles' battery of Barragan. However, these events were also observed by April Neeley, Mayo's girlfriend, who testified at trial, corroborating Mayo's testimony. As the convictions Robles sought to use in cross-examining Mayo were close to twenty years old, their probative value in impeaching Mayo would have been limited. Finally, Robles was properly permitted to cross-examine Mayo regarding his more recent convictions, indicating that the jury was aware that Mayo was not an extraordinarily credible witness. Given the other overwhelming evidence presented against Robles, including the testimony of April Neeley and Officer Kern, as well as several incriminating jailhouse statements made by Robles while awaiting trial, we conclude that the district court's error in excluding evidence related to Mayo's earlier convictions and habitual offender eligibility was harmless.

Exclusion of 911 transcript

Robles next contends that the district court erred by excluding the recording of certain 911 calls made after the incident, as well as

... continued

Tavares, 117 Nev. at 732, 30 P.3d at 1132. While Robles contends that the restriction of his impeachment of Mayo violated his confrontation and due process rights, Lobato establishes that the nonconstitutional standard set forth in NRS 178.598 governs errors related to the restriction of impeachment. Lobato, 120 Nev. at 521, 96 P.3d at 772. However, even using the more stringent standard for constitutional error set forth in Chapman v. California, we conclude that the error was harmless. 386 U.S. 18, 21-24 (1967) (establishing that a court need not reverse a conviction if the alleged error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

dispatch communications and incident recall logs related to those calls. This court reviews a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.¹⁵

According to Robles, dispatchers received a 911 call at 9:39 p.m. on August 24, 2001, in which an unidentified individual informed dispatchers that he had heard four to five shots fired and then had seen several black male adults run through the apartment complex grounds. The identity of the caller was never established. At trial, Robles, who is apparently Hispanic, offered the recording and related documents to support his defense theory of mistaken identity. While the district court did not state a detailed basis for excluding the recording, it appears that the court accepted the State's arguments that the transcripts and related documents constituted inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.

As indicated in NRS 51.035, "[h]earsay' means a statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Hearsay is generally inadmissible at trial, unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies.¹⁶ NRS 51.095, the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, provides that "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition is not inadmissible under the hearsay rule." In Medina v. State, this court clarified that "[t]he proper focus of the excited utterance inquiry is whether the declarant made the statement while under the stress of the startling event," not merely the amount of time

¹⁵Atkins v. State, 112 Nev. 1122, 1127, 923 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1996).

¹⁶NRS 51.065.

elapsed between the event and the statement.¹⁷ Thus, this court has noted that 911 calls may be properly admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.¹⁸

Based on the above, we conclude that the 911 recording and related documents were admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, indicating that the district court abused its discretion in excluding them from evidence. However, given the other overwhelming evidence presented against Robles, including testimony by Neeley and Mayo, and Robles' own incriminating jailhouse statements, we further conclude that any resulting error was harmless.¹⁹

Admission of jailhouse communications

Robles further argues that the district court erred in admitting the recordings and transcripts of several telephone calls Robles made while in custody at CCDC prior to trial. In one of these calls, Robles and his mother discussed changing his theory of defense from an alibi

¹⁷122 Nev. ___, ___, 143 P.3d 471, 475 (2006).

¹⁸See City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 120 Nev. 392, 398-99, 91 P.3d 591, 595 (2004) (noting that, absent Crawford-type concerns, a "911 call would be properly admitted as an excited utterance").

¹⁹See NRS 178.598 (indicating that this court must disregard any error that does not affect a defendant's substantial rights); Tavares, 117 Nev. at 732, 30 P.3d at 1132 (stating that this court will disregard error if it did not have a "substantial and injurious effect" on the jury's verdict). While Robles contends that this error is constitutional in dimension, we conclude that it is nonconstitutional in nature, and more appropriately evaluated using the standard set forth in NRS 178.598 and Tavares. However, even using the more stringent standard for constitutional error set forth in Chapman, we conclude that the error was harmless. 386 U.S. 18, 21-24 (1967).

defense to self-defense, and Robles stated that “[his attorney is] going to have to tell them yes, that I got to shooting but it was with—.” At trial, Robles maintained that he was not present at the shooting on August 24. In a second conversation, Robles and an acquaintance discussed the clothes Robles was going to wear at trial, and Robles indicated that he was going to “f—in’ get” a witness who was planning to testify against him. As indicated above, this court reviews the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude this evidence for an abuse of discretion.²⁰

Robles asserts that the district court erred in admitting the intercepted conversations for a variety of reasons, arguing that the conversations were illegally intercepted, that the conversations impermissibly referenced Robles’ in-custody status, that they constituted improper commentary on Robles’ theory of the case, that the conversations contained inadmissible hearsay, and that the district court’s failure to offer a curative jury instruction in connection with the communications constituted reversible error. We disagree.

Interception of conversations

Robles first argues that the conversations were illegally intercepted and, therefore, inadmissible. Generally, the provisions of NRS Chapter 179 prohibit the intentional interception of oral communications using an electronic, mechanical or other device. NRS 179.465 specifically provides that recordings of communications intercepted by an electronic or mechanical device are not admissible in a criminal proceeding. However, NRS 179.425(1)(b) stipulates that “[e]lectronic, mechanical or other

²⁰Atkins v. State, 112 Nev. 1122, 1127, 923 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1996).

device” does not include devices “used by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties.”

In this case, Robles contends that the recording of his conversations at the CCDC does not fall within the law enforcement exception, because the conversations were not recorded in the ordinary course of business. Specifically, Robles argues that the recording of his prison communications far exceeded that allowed by the law enforcement exception. In support, Robles cites United States v. Lanoue,²¹ a federal case interpreting the nearly identical “law enforcement exception” language of federal wiretapping statutes. In Lanoue, the court concluded that the law enforcement exception applies only to those communications intercepted in the ordinary course of duty of law enforcement.²² Thus, if calls are intercepted for the purposes of gathering evidence, rather than for prison security purposes, monitoring does not occur in the ordinary course of business.²³ Accordingly, the court concluded that if a prisoner did not receive notice and consent to monitoring, and a call was intercepted pursuant to a detective’s request, rather than for routine monitoring purposes, it was not admissible at the prisoner’s criminal trial.²⁴

²¹71 F.3d 966 (1st Cir. 1995).

²²Id. at 981.

²³Id. at 982.

²⁴Id.

Like the prisoner in Lanoué, Robles contends that the monitoring of his telephone conversations in this situation took place for investigative purposes, rather than in the ordinary course of jail security monitoring. In this, Robles notes that the State provided defense counsel with three compact discs containing in excess of 522 intercepted conversations. Based on the large number of communications, Robles asserts that the monitoring in this case could not possibly have been done in the ordinary course of law enforcement, for the purposes of maintaining safety and security. We disagree.

As noted in several federal decisions, the routine recording of all outbound inmate telephone calls occurs in the ordinary course of business, and admission of these recordings at trial does not violate federal wiretapping statutes.²⁵ Here, it appears that CCDC has implemented an across the board policy of recording all inmate telephone calls, except those calls involving attorney-client communications. Given the apparent “blanket monitoring” recording policy in place at CCDC, we conclude that despite Robles’ contentions, he was not specifically “targeted” for investigation, nor were his phone calls specifically monitored for investigative purposes. Thus, as several federal cases,

²⁵See U.S. v. Faulkner, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1114 (D. Kan. 2004) (noting that under the law enforcement exception, “routine and almost universal recording of phone lines by police departments and prisons, as well as other law enforcement institutions, is exempt from [federal wiretapping statutes]”); U.S. v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 291 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that recordings of a prisoner’s telephone calls were properly admitted at trial under federal wiretapping statutes when the correctional center recording the calls routinely recorded all outbound inmate telephone calls).

interpreting the almost identical “law enforcement exception” under federal wiretapping statutes, indicate that across the board recording of all inmate telephone conversations serves the ordinary purposes of preserving prison security, we conclude that the recording and admission of Robles’ telephone calls at CCDC did not violate the wiretapping provisions of NRS Chapter 179.

Reference to in-custody status

Robles next contends that the district court erred in failing to exclude the jailhouse communications from evidence because they impermissibly referenced Robles’ in-custody status. Generally, “[t]he rule that one is innocent until proven guilty means that a defendant is entitled to not only the presumption of innocence, but also to the indicia of innocence.”²⁶ Accordingly, both this court and the United States Supreme Court have indicated that a defendant has a right to appear in front of a jury without physical restraints or jail clothing, and the trial court may not reference the fact that the defendant is incarcerated.²⁷

Robles argues that the intercepted phone calls were “replete with comments regarding Appellant’s custodial status,” and including comments related to bringing Robles’ clothes for trial, comments about potential visitors, and the background noise of a jail. However, based on the minor nature of these comments, and the fact that defense counsel’s own cross-examination of an LVMPD detective revealed that Robles was

²⁶Haywood v. State, 107 Nev. 285, 288, 809 P.2d 1272, 1273 (1991).

²⁷See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1976); Haywood, 107 Nev. at 288, 809 P.2d at 1273.

in custody, we conclude that the effect of any of these comments was harmless.²⁸

Commentary on Robles' theory of defense and shifting the burden of proof

Robles next argues that because the admitted conversations contained comments by himself and his mother regarding his attorney's refusal to present an alibi defense and the possibility of arguing self-defense, admission of the recordings constituted improper commentary on Robles' theory of defense and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Robles.

A defendant in a criminal case is generally entitled to present the jury with his theory of the case and may request a jury instruction on his theory, so long as there is some evidence, no matter how weak or incredible, to support it.²⁹ This includes theories that are disparate or inconsistent.³⁰ However, as the burden of proof lies with the State, a defendant is also entitled to remain silent and present no defense at all.³¹ Thus, it is "improper for a prosecutor to comment on the defense's failure

²⁸See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-24 (1967) (establishing that a court need not reverse a conviction if the alleged error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

²⁹Williams v. State, 99 Nev. 530, 531, 665 P.2d 260, 261 (1983).

³⁰Walker v. State, 110 Nev. 571, 577, 876 P.2d 646, 649 (1994).

³¹Washington v. State, 112 Nev. 1067, 1071-72, 922 P.2d 547, 549 (1996).

to produce evidence” because such comments shift the burden of proof to the defense.³²

Nonetheless, we have also indicated that “[d]eclarations made after the commission of the crime which indicate consciousness of guilt, or are inconsistent with innocence, or tend to establish intent may be admissible.”³³ Despite Robles’ contentions, we conclude that his comments regarding his switch from an alibi defense to a self-defense theory, and his implicit admission that he was present at the shooting were admissible to demonstrate Robles’ consciousness of guilt. Given this purpose, we further conclude that these comments did not impermissibly shift any burden of proof to Robles, nor did they constitute impermissible commentary on his theory of defense.

Hearsay and failure to give a curative instruction

Finally, Robles argues that portions of the conversation between him and his mother regarding his theory of defense constituted inadmissible hearsay and that the district court erred in failing to provide a curative instruction after the statements were admitted. While Robles apparently concedes that his own statements are admissible non-hearsay statements of a party opponent,³⁴ he argues that his mother’s statements and any of Robles’ statements recounting statements by his attorney, Mr. Buchanan, were hearsay.

³²Whitney v. State, 112 Nev. 499, 502, 915 P.2d 881, 883 (1996).

³³Bellon v. State, 121 Nev. 436, 444, 117 P.3d 176, 181 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Abram v. State, 95 Nev. 352, 356, 594 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1979)).

³⁴See NRS 51.035(3)(a).

We disagree. As indicated above, “[h]earsay’ means a statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”³⁵ In this case, we conclude that statements by Robles’ mother were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rather, the statements provided context for Robles’ own admissions to his mother. Similarly, Robles’ statement that “[Mr. Buchanan’s] going to have to tell them that yes, I got to shooting but it was with—” was offered to demonstrate Robles’ consciousness of guilt, not for the truth of the matter asserted.³⁶ Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in admitting these statements or in failing to provide a curative instruction.

CONCLUSION


In addition to the claims discussed above, we have also considered Robles’ remaining arguments, including those related to admission of Barragan’s voluntary statement to the police during the penalty phase, the failure of the State to disclose an anonymous informant, the legality of Robles’ arrest, and the failure to sever charges against Robles. We conclude that none of these errors deprived Robles of a fair trial. In light of the overwhelming evidence presented against Robles, including the testimony of Mayo, Neeley, and his own recorded statements


³⁵NRS 51.035.


³⁶This same analysis also applies to the conversations in which Robles indicated his willingness to “get” one of the trial witnesses.

during jailhouse telephone conversations, we further conclude that cumulative error does not warrant reversal. Therefore, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.


_____, J.
Cherry


_____, J.
Maupin


_____, J.
Saitta

cc: Hon. Stewart L. Bell, District Judge
Law Office of John J. Momot
Attorney General Catherine Cortez Masto/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney David J. Roger
Eighth District Court Clerk