

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EDWARD KEVIN STALL,  
Petitioner,

vs.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT  
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,  
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF  
CLARK, AND THE HONORABLE  
SANDRA L. POMRENZE, DISTRICT  
JUDGE, FAMILY COURT DIVISION,

Respondents,

and

VICKI L. STALL,  
Real Party in Interest.

No. 46230

**FILED**

DEC 05 2005

JANETTE M. BLOOM  
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT  
BY *J. Richards*  
DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI,  
MANDAMUS, OR PROHIBITION

This is an original petition for a writ of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition challenging a district court order awarding temporary spousal support.

We have considered this petition, and we are not satisfied that this court's intervention by way of extraordinary relief is warranted at this time. In particular, it appears that petitioner will have an adequate legal

remedy in the form of an appeal from the final divorce decree.<sup>1</sup>  
Accordingly, we deny the petition.<sup>2</sup>

It is so ORDERED.<sup>3</sup>

Douglas, J.  
Douglas

Rose, J.  
Rose

Parraguirre, J.  
Parraguirre

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<sup>1</sup>See NRAP 3A(a) and (b)(1); Guerin v. Guerin, 114 Nev. 127, 131, 953 P.2d 716, 719 (1998) (recognizing that an appeal is an adequate legal remedy), abrogated on other grounds by Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners, 116 Nev. 646, 5 P.3d 569 (2000); NRS 34.020 (providing that a writ of certiorari may issue only if there is no appeal or other adequate remedy); NRS 34.170 (stating that a writ of mandamus may only issue if there is no other adequate and speedy legal remedy); NRS 34.330 (indicating that a writ of prohibition may only issue if there is no adequate and speedy legal remedy).

<sup>2</sup>See NRAP 21(b).

<sup>3</sup>In light of this order, we deny as moot petitioner's request for a stay. In addition, we note that petitioner has not satisfied the provisions of NRAP 8(a) for obtaining a stay. Specifically, petitioner has not shown that he applied to the district court for a stay or that application to the district court would not be practicable. See NRAP 8(a) (stating that generally, a stay must first be sought in the district court unless seeking such relief in the district court is not practicable); see also Fritz Hansen A/S v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 650, 6 P.3d 982 (2000).

cc: Hon. Sandra Pomrenze, District Judge, Family Court Division  
Graves & Leavitt  
Webster & Associates  
Clark County Clerk