IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA


SAMUEL D. DAVIS,
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

No. 45403

FILED

AUG 1 8 2005

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE



This is a proper person appeal from an order of the district court denying a motion for credit. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Joseph T. Bonaventure, Judge.

We have reviewed the record on appeal and we conclude that the district court did not err in denying appellant's motion for the reasons stated in the attached order. Therefore, briefing and oral argument are not warranted in this case.¹ Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Rose J.
Gibbons

Hardesty, J

¹See <u>Luckett v. Warden</u>, 91 Nev. 681, 682, 541 P.2d 910, 911 (1975).

cc: Hon. Joseph T. Bonaventure, District Judge Samuel D. Davis Attorney General Brian Sandoval/Carson City Clark County District Attorney David J. Roger Clark County Clerk

ORIGINAL 15 1 **FFCL BRIAN SANDOVAL** FILED Attorney General By: HEIDI E. NAGEL (Bar No. 7839) Deputy Attorney General 3 Special Prosecutions Unit chief it hargine 555 E. Washington Ave. #3900 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 5 (702) 486-3825 Facsimile: (702) 486-3768 6 Attorneys for Respondent 7 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 11 SAMUEL D. DAVIS. 12 Petitioner. Attorney General's Office 555 E. Washington, Suite 3900 Las Vegas, NV 89101 CASE NO. C 139123 13 DEPT. NO. VS. 14 JAMES SCHOMIG et al., 15 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 16 Respondents. 17 18 DATE: May 11, 2005 TIME: 8:30 a.m. 19 20 The above-captioned court conducted a hearing on a motion filed by inmate SAMUEL 21 D. DAVIS (DAVIS). This court, construing the motion as a post-conviction petition for a writ of 22 habeas corpus hereby issues this order disposing of the petition pursuant to NRS 34.830. 23 In his motion, DAVIS contended that he was entitled to seven (7) years, nine (9) months credit for time served against Count II (i.e., Robbery) of his current sentence. 24 RECEIVED Additionally, DAVIS sought clarification of the Judgment of Conviction rendered against him MAY 1 6 2005 on December 23, 1996. DAVIS, in Properia Persona, was not present at the hearing. Respondents were represented by Deputy Attorney General Heidi E. Nagel. Upon review of DAVIS' motion,

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Respondents' Answer and Motion to Dismiss and the pleadings and papers on file herein, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. On December 23, 1996, Petitioner Samuel D. Davis (DAVIS) was sentenced to a term of fifteen (15) years imprisonment with the possibility of parole for Robbery (i.e., Count I). DAVIS received a consecutive sentence of fifteen (15) years imprisonment with the possibility of parole for a second count of Robbery (Count II).
- 2. The district court further ordered that Counts I and II would run concurrent to DAVIS' term of imprisonment in the state of California.
- 3. The effective date of Counts I and II running concurrent to DAVIS' California term of imprisonment is the date of DAVIS' sentencing in the district court (i.e., December 23, 1996).
- 4. Correspondence attached to DAVIS' motion indicated that the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) stated DAVIS had a projected discharge date of February 28, 2006, on his first sentence based on the assumption that he would earn full statutory good time and work credits. Additionally, NDOC indicated that DAVIS would discharge on his second sentence in approximately nine (9) years based on the 1/3 Parole Law. Again, this projection, as NDOC noted, was based on the assumption that DAVIS would earn full statutory good time and work time credits.
- 5. DAVIS contends that his California sentence began on October 17, 1995, and expired on December 3, 2003.
- 6. DAVIS asserted constitutional error (i.e., a denial of due process of law and of equal protection under the law) where NDOC has failed to recognize the Judgment of Conviction issued on December 23, 1996, in its entirety. DAVIS argued that whatever time he concurrently served in California as to Count I must also be applied to Count II. Accordingly, DAVIS contended that he failed to receive credit against Count II. Further, DAVIS appeared to argue that he is entitled to credit for flat time served as to both Counts I and II after the

California term of imprisonment expired on December 3, 2003. DAVIS asserted that he is entitled to seven (7) years, nine (9) months credit against Count II.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 1. A post-conviction petition for habeas corpus is the proper vehicle for a party challenging the computation of time that has been served pursuant to a judgment of conviction.¹
- 2. A petitioner bears the burden of proof regarding the claim set forth and, where a petitioner has failed, "NRS 34.810(3) requires the petitioner to plead and prove specific facts demonstrating good cause and for a failure 'to present the claim or for presenting the claim again' and actual prejudice."²
 - 3. Naked allegations, unsupported by fact, do not support a claim for relief.³
- 4. DAVIS has filed a "motion" seeking credit for flat time served. The motion is improper. DAVIS would be required to file a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on the relief he is seeking.
- 5. Even assuming DAVIS' "motion" as a petition for post-conviction habeas relief, DAVIS is not entitled to the relief sought. In the present case, documents from NDOC indicate that DAVIS must first expire Count I of the Judgment of Conviction before anytime statutory good time and/or work time will be applied to Count II.

¹NRS 34.720(1); NRS 34.724(2)(c) (stating, in relevant part, that a post-conviction petition for habeas relief "is the only remedy available to an incarcerated person to challenge the computation of time that he has served pursuant to a judgment of conviction.")

²Nika v. State, 120 Nev. ___, ___, 97 P.3d 1140, 1145 (2004) (quoting <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984)). Accord <u>State v. Eighth Judicial District Court et al.</u>, 120 Nev. ___, ___, 97 P.3d 594, 602 (2004).

³<u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

⁴NRS 34.720(1); NRS 34.724(2)(c).

- 6. NDOC documents further indicate DAVIS has been earning both statutory good time and work time credits since 1996.
- 7. Based on the sentence structure correctly enunciated in the Judgment of Conviction, Count I would first run concurrent to the California sentence. Only if the California sentence exceeded Count I's expiration, would Count II have begun to run concurrent to the California term of imprisonment. Therefore, because the California sentence expired on December 3, 2003, and Count I has yet to expire (i.e., most current projected discharge date of January 24, 2006), DAVIS is not entitled to receive accrued credit as to Count II.

<u>ORDER</u>

- 1. DAVIS' has filed a motion with the Court challenging the computation of his credit for time served. A post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper vehicle for making such a challenge. Although DAVIS' motion is not properly before this Court, the Court construes the motion as a post-conviction petition for habeas relief.
- 2. The Judgment of Conviction indicates DAVIS' sentences as to Counts I and II run consecutively. All time earned must run, first, against Count I and, following the expiration of Count I, against Count II. Therefore, no error in the computation of DAVIS' terms of imprisonment has occurred.
 - 3. DAVIS is not entitled to credit for flat time served.

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