

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

WALTER H. CRUTCHFIELD, AND
EXECUTIVE SUITES OF LAS VEGAS,
D/B/A PARADISE PERMANENT
MAKEUP,

Appellants,

vs.

MIN-SWI PAN, D/B/A MIN
PERMANENT MAKEUP,
Respondent.

No. 42902

FILED

MAR 19 2004

JANETTE M. BLOOM
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY *J. Richards*
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This proper person appeal is taken from a district court minute order denying a motion to reinstate an action. Our review of the documents transmitted under NRAP 3(e) reveals that we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

First, we note that appellant Executive Suites of Las Vegas is a business organization that cannot appeal in proper person. As we recognized in Guerin v. Guerin,¹ “[a]lthough an individual is entitled to represent himself or herself in the district court, no rule or statute permits a non-attorney to represent any other person, a company, a trust, or any other entity in the district courts or in this court.” Consequently, the notice of appeal, filed by appellant Walter Crutchfield, a non-attorney, on

¹116 Nev. 210, 214, 993 P.2d 1256, 1258 (2000) (citation omitted).

behalf of appellant Executive Suites, was ineffective, and we therefore must dismiss Executive Suites' appeal on that basis.²

Additionally, this appeal is taken from a minute order. Under NRAP 4(a)(1), "[a] notice of appeal filed after the oral pronouncement of a decision or order but before the entry of a written judgment or order shall have no effect."³ Instead, NRAP 4(a)(1) requires that a notice of appeal be filed after the written judgment or order is entered and no more than thirty days after notice of the judgment or order's entry is served. Consequently, the notice of appeal was premature and ineffective.

Finally, even if a written order denying the motion to reinstate had been entered, it appears that such an order would not be substantively appealable. Although NRAP 3A(b)(2) authorizes an appeal from a special order after final judgment, an appealable special order is one that changes a party's rights and liabilities flowing from the final judgment.⁴ In this case, it appears that although the district court orally dismissed the complaint on January 16, 2004, the court has not yet entered a written order of dismissal, which would constitute the final judgment, appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(1). A written order denying the motion to reinstate the action would not change any written dismissal

²Id.

³See also Rust v. Clark Cty. School District, 103 Nev. 686, 747 P.2d 1380 (1987).

⁴Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 59 P.3d 1220 (2002).

order in any way, and would therefore not be an appealable special order after final judgment.

As we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal, we dismiss it.

It is so ORDERED.

Becker, J.
Becker

Agosti, J.
Agosti

Gibbons, J.
Gibbons

cc: Hon. Valorie Vega, District Judge
Walter H. Crutchfield
Marc D. Risman
Clark County Clerk